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95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017)

LOCAL LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW*
TIMOTHY MEYER**
On February 4, 2016, the United States and eleven other
countries signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)—the
most far-reaching free trade agreement since the World Trade
Organization’s founding in 1995. Unlike most prior trade
agreements, the TPP’s purported benefits do not come primarily
from reductions in tariffs paid on goods at the border. Instead,
they flow from assumptions that so-called non-tariff barriers—
such as discrimination against foreign investors or service
providers—will fall significantly under the TPP.
Yet to date, unnoticed among the TPP’s thirty chapters,
schedules, and annexes, are provisions that exempt state,
provincial, and local measures from compliance with many of
the agreement’s nondiscrimination rules. Under the TPP,
subnational governments such as California or Ontario—
governments with substantial regulatory authority over regional
economies much larger than many national economies—may
continue to discriminate against foreign investors or foreign
service providers indefinitely. These exemptions represent the
multilateralization of a trend underway for a number of years in
U.S. treaty practice: efforts to reduce the federal government’s
liability for subnational action that the federal government often
cannot control and of which it is frequently unaware. Indeed,
forty-one percent of the claims brought under the investor-state
dispute settlement (“ISDS”) provisions of the 1994 North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) have challenged
subnational government action. These exemptions also reflect a
growing pushback against ISDS in countries such as Australia,
France, Germany, and the United States.
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Environmental Regulation: Experimenting Across Scales in Tel Aviv. Thanks to
Demetrios Festa for research assistance.
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Contrary to U.S. treaty practice and ISDS’s critics, this Article
argues that foreign investors or aggrieved trading partners should
be able to make their claims directly against subnational
governments, such as California, rather than only against
national governments, like the United States. The case is made by
presenting and analyzing international liability rules for local
action. Governments use three kinds of local liability rules: (1)
immunity, under which neither the subnational nor national
governments are answerable under international law for the
actions of a subnational government; (2) vicarious liability,
under which nations are liable for the actions of their subnational
units even if they do not control them as a matter of domestic
law; and (3) direct liability, under which a claimant’s case is
brought directly against the offending subnational government.
Vicarious liability is the default rule under the international law
of state responsibility. However, immunity—the rule under an
increasing number of economic treaties, including the TPP’s
investment and services chapters—is on the rise. Direct liability is
rare, but exists in certain investment agreements and applies to
the European Union.
The choice among these liability rules is the most important front
in efforts to reconcile a robust federalism with the increasing
importance of local governments to international affairs—an
ongoing battle in the United States, the European Union, and
other federal nations. Direct liability best achieves the twin goals
of fostering local governance and international cooperation for
three reasons. First, direct liability would force subnational
governments to internalize the costs of their actions, thereby
deterring violations. Under vicarious liability, the costs of
violations are borne by the national government, and under
immunity, they are borne by the claimant who is left with no
recourse. Second, a move to direct liability would have beneficial
distributional consequences, ensuring that powerful federal
nations do not force liberalization in developing countries while
protecting discriminatory practices within their own countries.
Third, a move to direct liability would recognize the considerably
more important role subnational governments play in
international affairs today. From climate change and renewable
energy to international trade, subnational governments are
incredibly active in tackling matters of international concern.
They should also bear responsibility for their actions.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 2016, the United States and eleven other
countries signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”).1 Touted by
1. Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed in Auckland, BBC NEWS (Feb. 4,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35480600 [http://perma.cc/FL22-B3XW]. As this
Article goes to press, the TPP’s future has become uncertain in light of U.S. Presidentelect Donald Trump’s pledge not to go forward with the agreement. Nicky Woolf, Justin
McCurry & Benjamin Haas, Trump to Withdraw from Trans-Pacific Partnership on First
Day in Office, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2016, 5:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/nov/21/donald-trump-100-days-plans-video-trans-pacific-partnership-withdraw
[https://perma.cc/8CDD-ZPU8]. The analysis in this Article of liability rules for
subnational governments does not depend, however, on whether the United States
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President Obama as “writ[ing] the rules of global trade for the 21st
century[,]” the twelve TPP signatories account for forty percent of
global GDP and one-third of global trade.2 These figures stand to
grow, both as the size of Asian economies increase and as potential
new members, such as South Korea3 and China,4 join the agreement.
In short, its proponents view the TPP as the “state of the art for
international trade agreements,” creating a powerful precedent for
future economic integration.5 Economists disagree about the TPP’s
effects. While some argue that the TPP will lead to higher
unemployment and inequality,6 most agree that the agreement will
lead to significant income growth across member states.7 Unlike most
prior trade agreements,8 however, the TPP’s purported benefits do
not come primarily from reductions in tariffs paid on goods at the
border; instead, they flow from assumptions that so-called non-tariff
barriers—such as discrimination against foreign investors or service
providers—will fall significantly under the TPP.9

ultimately joins the TPP. As discussed infra, the TPP’s local liability rules are similar to
those found in many other international economic law agreements.
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama in Meeting on the TransPacific Partnership (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11
/18/remarks-president-obama-meeting-trans-pacific-partnership [http://perma.cc/2H74-HNTJ].
3. Kwanwoo Jun, South Korea Reiterates Interest in Trans-Pacific Partnership, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-reiteratesinterest-in-trans-pacific-partnership-1444057143.
4. Sarah Hsu, China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-and-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ [http://perma.cc/6M6G2KCE] (“China has long stated that it is willing to consider joining the Trans-Pacific
Partnership . . . .”).
5. ADVISORY COMM. FOR TRADE POLICY & NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) 5 (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files
/Advisory-Committee-on-Trade-Policy-and-Negotiations.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UE8-BF9W].
6. See Jeronim Capaldo & Alex Izurieta, Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality
and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 1 (Glob. Dev. & Env’t Inst.,
Working Paper No. 16-01, 2016), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/16-01CapaldoIzurietaTPP.pdf [http://perma.cc/44DN-MZES].
7. See, e.g., Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates 1–3 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working
Paper No. 16-2, 2016), http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp16-2.pdf [https://perma.cc
/DFT6-WWZP].
8. See, e.g., Summary of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 2004), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/factsheets/archives/2004/february/summary-us-australia-free-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc
/2FJK-ZWFE] (noting that the Australia-U.S. FTA provided “immediate benefits for
America’s manufacturing workers” pursuant to significant tariff reductions).
9. Dani Rodrik, The Trade Numbers Game, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/tpp-debate-economic-benefits-by-dani-rodrik2016-02 [http://perma.cc/ACG7-NNRB].
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This Article argues that the TPP is unlikely to reduce
discrimination significantly in many major TPP signatory nations.
Unnoticed among the thirty chapters, schedules, and annexes are
provisions that exempt existing state, provincial, and local measures
from the nondiscrimination rules contained in the investment and
services chapters.10 Local, state, and provincial governments can
therefore continue to discriminate against foreign investors and
service providers indefinitely. To give but one example, international
tribunals have held that state and local laws that permit services such
as gambling and betting to be provided in person but not online
discriminate unlawfully against foreign service providers.11 Under the
TPP, these laws would be immune from challenge.12
These exemptions represent the multilateralization of a trend
underway for a number of years in U.S. treaty practice: efforts to
immunize the federal government against liability for subnational
government action that it often cannot control and of which it is
frequently unaware. Indeed, forty-one percent of the claims brought
under the investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) provisions of
the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) have
challenged subnational government action.13 These exemptions also
reflect a growing pushback against ISDS, a push led by Senator
Elizabeth Warren14 in the United States and supported by nations

10. Trans-Pacific Partnership arts. 9.12, 10.7, opened for signature Feb. 4, 2016
[hereinafter TPP] (providing that the nondiscrimination rules contained in chapter 9 on
investment and chapter 10 on trade in services “shall not apply to: any existing nonconforming measure . . . [at] a regional level of government, as set out by that Party in its
Schedule to Annex I, or a local level of government[,]” as well as the continuation,
renewal, or amendment of such measures). The four federal TPP signatories—Australia,
Canada, Mexico, and the United States—included reservations in their schedules that
exempted all non-conforming measures at the state or provincial levels of government. See
id. Annexes I & II. For the full text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, see TPP Full Text,
OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements
/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/723C-AZ6E].
11. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 5, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr.
7, 2005) (finding that U.S. and local laws prohibiting internet gambling while permitting
in-person gambling violate the General Agreement on Trade in Services).
12. See infra Section I.B.
13. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
14. Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [http://perma.cc/4BSD-36JR].
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such as Australia,15 France, and Germany.16 These critics call for an
end to the system that allows private citizens to sue governments for
violations of rights conferred by economic treaties.17 While these
exemptions do not end ISDS, they are part of an increasingly large
hole in the scope of governmental action subject to review by
tribunals.18 Along with sector-specific carve-outs for politically
noxious industries such as tobacco,19 exemptions for subnational
discrimination could presage ISDS’s death by a thousand cuts.
Contrary to U.S. treaty practice, this Article argues that foreign
investors or aggrieved trading partners should be able to bring claims
directly against subnational governments such as California, rather
than only against national governments like the United States. The
choice among liability rules for subnational action is the most
important front in efforts to reconcile a robust federalism with the
increasing importance of subnational governments to international
affairs—an ongoing battle in the United States, the European Union
(“EU”), and other federal nations. The trend towards immunity
means that increasingly large swaths of regulatory activity remain
outside international economic law’s disciplines. Insulating
subnational measures from international review may also encourage
nations with malleable federal structures—where regulatory authority
can be reallocated from the center to local governments and vice
versa—to push discriminatory activity down to the local level. (This
Article shall use the terms “subnational” and “local”

15. See Tom Iggulden, Trans-Pacific Partnership Opposition Blamed on Dispute
Clauses, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-01/transpacificpartnership-why-so-much-opposition/6363326 [https://perma.cc/TP6A-FV85].
16. Cecile Barbiere, France and Germany to Form United Front Against ISDS,
EURACTIV (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/france-andgermany-form-united-front-against-isds-311267 [http://perma.cc/V4TZ-UNFS].
17. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14 (arguing that ISDS may make sense “in an
arbitration between two corporations, but not in cases between corporations and
governments”).
18. These exemptions originated in bilateral investment agreements, largely in
response to the different incentives created by investor-state dispute settlement. See infra
Section III.B. Today, though, these exemptions appear both in the investment and trade
services chapters of agreements such as the TPP. See TPP, supra note 10, art. 11.10. I
therefore discuss both trade and investment throughout the Article, although I do
differentiate between the two. Investment disputes are between private parties and states
and lead to monetary awards, while trade disputes are between states only and lead to the
reciprocal withdrawal of concessions. See infra notes 187–90 and accompanying text.
These differences in dispute resolution have important implications for states’ willingness
to use immunity. See infra Part III.
19. TPP, supra note 10, art. 29.5 (“A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B
of Chapter 9 (Investment) with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure.”).
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interchangeably.20) It also has distributional implications, as federal
nations are more likely to get away with significant discrimination
than are unitary states. California’s economy, to take the most
significant example, would be the sixth largest national economy in
the world.21 Under the TPP, California is free to continue its existing
discriminatory practices while smaller economies such as Vietnam or
New Zealand must cease. Direct liability, on the other hand, better
achieves the twin goals of fostering local governance and
international cooperation.
To make the case, I present the first study of international
liability rules for local action. I find that countries use three different
local liability rules: strict vicarious liability, immunity, and direct
liability. Strict vicarious liability is the default rule that applies under
international law.22 A national government is liable for the actions of
its subnational units, even when it does not control those actions.
Thus, for example, when the province of Ontario provides
discriminatory renewable energy subsidies, Canada, and not Ontario,
is the party held accountable before the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) and a NAFTA investment tribunal.23 Similarly, when the
State of Washington provides subsidies to Boeing that violate the
WTO’s rules, the United States—not Washington—is held
responsible through the WTO dispute settlement system.24

20. One can think of four levels of governmental action: international, national,
regional (i.e., state or provincial), and local (e.g., city, county, town). These terms quickly
become confusing. For example, in international law, nations are referred to as “states,”
while federal countries such the United States, Mexico, and Australia refer to their
regional governments as “states.” Three levels of governance—international, national, and
subnational—are, for the most part, sufficient for my purposes. I shall therefore use both
the terms “subnational” and “local” to refer collectively to regional and local
governments. I shall use the term “state” to refer to nations except where the context
makes clear that I am referring to, e.g., U.S. states. Where I refer to them specifically, I
shall call city, county, and town governments “truly local.”
21. Robin Respant, California Passes France as World’s 6th-Largest Economy,
REUTERS, (June 17, 2016, 9:17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-californiaeconomy-idUSKCN0Z32K2 [https://perma.cc/4YBF-MVJD].
22. See infra Part I.
23. Appellate Body Reports, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program,
¶ 5.85, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 24, 2013)
[hereinafter Canada—Renewable Energy] (finding that Canada’s local content
requirement (“LCR”) programs—“Minimum Required Domestic Content Levels”—
violate article III, section 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
standards).
24. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft—(Second Complaint), ¶ 1350, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 23,
2012) [hereinafter U.S.—Aircraft] (holding that subsidies granted to Boeing by the State of
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Immunity, under which neither the national nor local
government can be held responsible for otherwise unlawful
discriminatory acts, has appeared with increasing frequency in
economic treaties in the last fifteen years.25 In U.S. treaty practice,
crafting exemptions for U.S. states, either through substantive law or
through reservations, has a long and sometimes contentious history.26
Immunity is a recent innovation in economic agreements, however.
As late as 1994, when nations negotiated the WTO agreements, they
expressed particular concern about the ability of local governments to
stymy efforts to liberalize international trade. The WTO’s Technical
Barriers to Trade Agreement (“TBT Agreement”), for example,
confirms not only that members are responsible for the actions of
their local governments;27 it also provides that “[m]embers shall
formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in
support of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other than
central government bodies.”28 The TBT Agreement thus provides an
independent duty to supervise local governments that goes beyond
mere responsibility for their actions. Today, however, a blanket
exemption for existing non-conforming local measures is standard in

Washington and the City of Wichita, Kansas, violated the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures).
25. Immunity is the rule that applies as a matter of domestic law in the United States
between the federal and state governments. A plaintiff may not sue the federal
government for actions of state governments, nor, as a result of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity, may a plaintiff sue the state (i.e., regional) government directly in
federal court unless the state has consented. U.S. CONST. amend XI; see also, e.g.,
Blatchford v. Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand . . . for the presupposition of our constitutional structure
which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact;
that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a State will
therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit, either
expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention.’ ”).
26. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 409 (2000) (discussing how, historically, the
United States has limited the application of international agreements to the states). A
recent example comes from the United States’ reservation to the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, where “[t]he United States of America reserve[d] the
right to assume obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with its
fundamental principles of federalism.” S. REP. NO. 109-4, § 2(1), at 6–7 (2005).
27. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 3.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
[hereinafter TBT Agreement] (providing with respect to local governments that
“[m]embers are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all
provisions of Article 2[,]” which provides the main substantive rules of the TBT
Agreement).
28. Id.
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multilateral trade and investment agreements, such as the TPP, as
well as federal nations’ bilateral investment treaties (“BIT”).29
Direct liability, under which claimants can bring claims directly
against an offending local government, is the least common of the
three rules. The International Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID Convention”) provides a mechanism
through which nations can render their local governments liable to
direct suit, but few nations avail themselves of this opportunity.30 The
EU and its member states also practice a form of direct liability in
their economic agreements.31 The rule exists domestically as well. The
United States Supreme Court held in Monell v. Dep’t. Social
Services32 that local governments can be sued even where U.S. state
governments—of which local governments are part—are immune
under the Eleventh Amendment.33
This Article argues that direct liability for subnational
governments should replace strict vicarious liability and immunity in
international economic law. This proposal has two components. First,
under the international law of state responsibility, local governments
should be directly responsible for their breaches of international
economic obligations. Second, grants of jurisdiction to international
tribunals to resolve trade and investment disputes should be
understood to include jurisdiction over claims against subnational
governments unless otherwise specified.34
This rule would have a number of beneficial consequences. First,
local governments presently externalize all international liability for
their actions. When a U.S. state or Canadian province violates an
29. See infra Section II.B.
30. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 25(1), 25(3), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, 575 U.NT.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
31. See infra Section I.C.
32. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
33. Id. at 690.
34. International law distinguishes between the law of state responsibility and
jurisdiction. The law of state responsibility describes when a state is responsible for a
breach of international law and the consequences thereof. See generally Int’l Law
Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, at
31, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility], http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XPT-F95X] (“These articles
seek to formulate . . . the basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of
States for their internationally wrongful acts.”). A state may have responsibility even if no
tribunal has jurisdiction. The concept of direct liability argued for here encompasses both
the notion of state responsibility and jurisdiction. Essentially, local governments would be
amenable to jurisdiction and responsible under international law to the same extent as
their parent states.
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international legal obligation, the federal government has no
mechanism to recoup from the local government the costs of either
defending the suit or any resulting liability.35 Thus, monetary awards
against the United States or Canada under an investment agreement
for violations by a subnational government are paid by the national
government, not by the responsible local government.36 Neither can
the federal government easily control the actions of local
governments. Resource constraints prevent federal governments in
large nations from monitoring all local government action. Moreover,
political and legal constraints make preempting local acts difficult at
best. For example, the United States federal government has the
power to seek a declaratory judgment that a state or local law is
preempted because it conflicts with U.S. obligations under the WTO
founding agreements.37 As far as I am aware, the federal government
has never exercised this authority.
Second, a move to direct liability would have beneficial
distributional and welfare consequences. Strict vicarious liability is
only a default rule. The countries that most frequently push to change
the default rule are large federal states such as the United States,
Canada, Mexico, and Australia.38 These powerful and wealthy
countries obtain immunity for their state and provincial governments,
which often have expansive regulatory powers.39 Meanwhile, many
weaker developing nations are centralized and thus do not benefit
from immunity for discriminatory regional acts. The result is that
federal countries may be permitted to discriminate at a higher rate
than unitary countries. In general, permitting discrimination to
continue is bad both for the unitary countries discriminated against,
as well as the consumers in the discriminating federal countries who
pay higher prices for goods, services, and capital as a result of their
own government’s discrimination.40
35. See infra Section II.A.1.
36. See infra notes 74–82 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(2) (2012) (“It is
the intention of Congress . . . to occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or
defense under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including by
precluding any person other than the United States from bringing any action against any
State or political subdivision thereof or raising any defense to the application of State
law . . . .”).
38. See infra Section I.B.
39. See infra Section I.B.
40. See Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public
Goods, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1937, 1942 (2015) (noting that “[f]oreign businesses and
disfavored domestic consumers absorb the economic costs [of discrimination]”).
Discrimination does create benefits for protected domestic producers and the politicians
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Third and finally, direct liability recognizes the considerably
more important role subnational governments play in international
affairs today. Strict vicarious liability pretends that the world is a
place in which actions with global consequences originate primarily in
national capitals. Yet the nation-state’s role has receded in favor of
both supranational and subnational action. Indeed, national
governments frequently contemplate a role for local governments in
fulfilling international objectives. To give but one example, on
September 15, 2015, the top climate change negotiators from the
United States and China met in Los Angeles.41 They did not meet to
discuss national efforts to mitigate climate change; instead, they
convened with the leaders of about a dozen American and Chinese
cities, states, and provinces to discuss local measures that “are
intended to support the achievement and implementation of each
country’s respective post-2020 national climate targets.”42 Direct
accountability is necessary to ensure that local governments can play
their important role in international affairs responsibly and
constructively.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I presents a novel survey
of the three local liability rules used in international law. This survey
demonstrates that immunity is on the rise. Part II analyzes these three
rules in light of the regulatory and compensatory functions of liability;
while strict vicarious liability and direct liability each have benefits,
immunity is the least efficient rule. This framework presents a puzzle:
if immunity is such an inefficient rule, why are nations increasingly
using it? Part III provides the answer to this question, showing that
large federal nations are willing to use their leverage in trade
negotiations to reduce local liability that they cannot easily avoid as a
matter of domestic law. Part IV considers the implications of the
trend towards immunity for international economic law. Part V
makes the case for direct liability as the default local liability rule.

they support, although in general, these benefits are outweighed by the costs to foreign
businesses and domestic consumers. Id. The exception to this rule is when discrimination
promotes some non-economic objective, such as environmental protection or health and
safety. See id. (arguing that discriminatory measures can facilitate the passage at the local
level of global public goods measures such as renewable energy subsidies).
41. U.S.-CHINA CLIMATE LEADERS’ DECLARATION: ON THE OCCASION OF THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE U.S.-CHINA CLIMATE-SMART/LOW-CARBON CITIES SUMMIT,
LOS ANGELES, CA, SEPTEMBER 15–16, 2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/us_china_climate_leaders_declaration_9_14_15_730pm_final.pdf [http://perma.cc
/2WUP-6TU5].
42. Id.
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I. THREE LIABILITY RULES
This Part presents the first comprehensive review of
international liability rules for local action. The default rule under
international law is that a national government is vicariously liable for
the actions of its subnational governments. Two alternative liability
schemes exist, however: immunity and direct liability. Under
immunity, a complainant does not have a claim against either the
subnational government or the national government. Under direct
liability, a complainant may make a claim directly against the
subnational government. As documented below, immunity for local
action is on the rise, but direct liability offers a promising alternative.
A. Strict Vicarious Liability
Strict vicarious liability (or “vicarious liability”) for national
governments is the default rule under international law. The
International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, which to a large extent reflect customary international
law,43 provide that the “conduct of any State organ shall be
considered an act of that State under international law . . . whatever
its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial
unit of the State.”44 Moreover, the draft articles provide that whether
a state has committed an internationally wrongful act “is not affected
by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.”45
Indeed, these provisions are bedrock principles of international law,
confirmed by dozens of cases.46
As a result, states bear legal responsibility under international
law for the actions of their local governments, even if the local
government’s actions are made pursuant to an express allocation of
authority between the national and local governments. The Consular
Cases provide a perfect illustration. The United States lost a series of
disputes before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),47
culminating in the Avena48 judgment, which held that the United

43. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 84.
44. Id. (“[Article 4.1] includes an organ of any territorial governmental entity within
the State on the same basis as the central governmental organs of that State . . . .”).
45. Id. at 36.
46. Id. at 75–90 & nn.78–125 (citing cases upholding these two principles).
47. See LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶ 128 (June 27);
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 248,
¶ 41 (Apr. 9).
48. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep.
12 (Mar. 31).
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States had violated the consular rights of Mexican nationals on death
row in Texas.49 In fact, Texas (and other U.S. states) had violated the
foreign nationals’ rights during the course of administering state
criminal law, and the remedy prescribed by the ICJ would have
required state court review of the foreign nationals’ convictions.50 In
Medellin v. Texas,51 the Supreme Court held that the President lacked
the ability to compel Texas to comply with the ICJ’s judgment.52 This
lack of presidential authority domestically, however, had no impact
on the United States’ international responsibility for the violations.53
The traditional justification for vicarious liability is that “federal
States vary widely in their structure and distribution of powers,
and . . . in most cases the constituent units have no separate
international legal personality of their own.”54 Because local
governments generally lack legal personality under international law
and therefore cannot bear legal responsibility, vicarious liability
ensures that all domestic exercises of governmental authority can be
reached by international law. In this sense, the rule holding a state
accountable for the actions of its constituent parts has similar
rationales to vicarious liability in tort law.55
In principle, vicarious liability need not be strict. Just as domestic
law sometimes only holds superiors responsible if they behave
negligently in supervising their subordinates,56 so too one can imagine
holding a state responsible only if it has failed to adequately exercise
its oversight authority over local governments.57 Instead, international
49. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 153.
50. Id. at 64–67.
51. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
52. Id. at 523–32.
53. Id. at 504 (“No one disputes that the Avena decision—a decision that flows from
the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to
Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the
United States. But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding
federal law enforceable in United States courts.”).
54. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 42.
55. See ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (2013); see also Attila Atanar, How Strict Is Vicarious
Liability? Reassessing the Enterprise Risk Theory, 64 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 63, 78–80
(2006) (describing various rationales for vicarious liability, including the composite theory,
under which an employee and an employer should be treated as a “single, unitary entity”).
56. Atanar, supra note 55, at 69 (discussing vicarious liability regimes in which the
employer’s conduct must itself be wrongful or negligent before vicarious liability arises).
57. Inevitably, however, such an inquiry would raise messy questions about a state’s
ability to oversee local government action. Who would determine whether the national
government had legal authority to correct a violation by a local government: national
courts or international tribunals? Even if a national government had the appropriate
authority, would it be entitled to a defense based on capabilities? Would developing
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law’s strict approach to vicarious liability follows what might be
termed a lowest-cost avoider approach. National governments are
better positioned than foreign governments to monitor and promote
local government compliance with international law. This justification
does not require that national governments have significant
monitoring and supervisory capacity as an absolute matter. It turns
only on relative capacity. This lowest-cost avoider rationale likely
made sense in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when
detailed information about foreign legal systems might not have been
readily available overseas. Today, however, technology has greatly
reduced the cost of researching foreign legal systems. National
governments may therefore no longer have a comparative advantage
in monitoring local action.58
Until recently, nations were so enamored of vicarious liability
that they actually sought to expand nations’ responsibility for local
governments by imposing an affirmative duty on nations to supervise
local government compliance with international economic treaties.
This duty was independent of and additional to liability for breaches
by local governments. Article 105 of NAFTA, for instance, provides
that “[t]he Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken
in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including
their observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by
state and provincial governments.”59 Likewise, the WTO’s TBT
Agreement contains an article on local governments. That article
confirms that “[m]embers are fully responsible under this Agreement
for the observance of all provisions of Article 2[,]” which provides the
main substantive rules of the TBT Agreement.60 Going beyond
confirming the default rule that states are responsible for local action,
however, the TBT Agreement provides that “[m]embers shall
formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in
support of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other than
central government bodies.”61
As a result of vicarious liability, nations are regularly called upon
to answer for the offenses of their local governments. To take but one
example, the peace treaty between the Allies and Italy at the end of

countries, for example, be less responsible for the actions of their local governments owing
to their relative resource constraints?
58. See infra Section II.A.
59. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 105, Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
60. TBT Agreement, supra note 27, art. 3.5.
61. Id.
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World War II established an obligation on Italy to return property
wrongfully taken from foreign nationals,62 as well as bilateral
conciliation commissions to arbitrate disputes between such nationals
and Italy.63 In Heirs of the Duc de Guise,64 a case involving an
expropriation effected by the Sicilian government, the Franco-Italian
Conciliation Commission made clear that “the Italian State is
responsible for implementing the Peace Treaty, even for Sicily,
notwithstanding the autonomy granted to Sicily in internal relations
under the public law of the Italian Republic.”65 The Franco-Mexican
Claims Commission reached a similar conclusion in a case involving
the taking of assets of a French citizen by the Mexican State of
Sonora.66 The commission noted that Mexico was responsible for the
conduct of its subunits “even in cases where the federal constitution
denies the central Government the right of control over the separate
States or the right to require them to comply, in their conduct, with
the rules of international law.”67
Although an old rule, the significance of vicarious liability has
dramatically increased with the creation of compulsory dispute
resolution mechanisms in investment and trade agreements. Prior to
the 1980s, state responsibility for local action existed in theory but
could only be tested before a tribunal if the parties happened to agree
to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Since then, however,
economic relations between states have been heavily judicialized.
Today over 2,500 BITs, preferential trade agreements such as
NAFTA and the TPP, and the WTO itself give international tribunals
compulsory jurisdiction over claims arising under those treaties.68

62. Treaty of Peace with Italy art. 75, ¶ 1, Feb. 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 747
(“Italy . . . shall return, in the shortest time possible, property removed from the territory
of any of the United Nations.”).
63. Id. art. 83.
64. 13 R.I.A.A. 150 (Franco-Italian Conciliation Comm’n 1951), translated in Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 88.
65. Id. at 161.
66. Estate of Hyacinthe Pellat v. United Mexican States (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R.I.A.A. 534
(1929), translated in Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 89.
67. Id. at 89. Interestingly, in its commentaries, the International Law Commission
notes that strict vicarious liability was not consistently followed until the late nineteenth
century, although it has consistently been followed since then. See id. at 88.
68. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 40–41 (2009) (chronicling the rise of, and subsequent changes to,
bilateral and regional investment agreements); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment
Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 125–28 (2003)
(discussing developing countries’ increased use of BITs in recent years to attract capital
from multinational companies).
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State responsibility for local action is thus engaged with considerably
greater frequency today than ever before.
NAFTA investor-state disputes clarify this trend. Investors have
filed seventy-eight claims total against the three NAFTA parties—
thirty-eight claims against Canada,69 twenty claims against Mexico,70
and twenty claims against the United States.71 Of these, thirty-three
challenge local action.72 Put differently, an astonishingly high 41% of
the investment claims brought under NAFTA—the largest
preferential trade agreement between federal countries currently in
force—seek to hold federal governments responsible for local
action.73
Canada, the most frequent respondent under NAFTA chapter
11, also has the highest percentage of claims involving local action.
Twenty-two of its thirty-eight claims involve local action, a
remarkable 58% of claims.74 These claims have created substantial
liability for Canada. For example, Canada settled the
AbitibiBowater75 dispute, in which Newfoundland and Labrador
expropriated the assets of a U.S. timber company, for $130 million
dollars.76 Moreover, Canada, like most federal countries, had no
domestic mechanism to impose this loss on the provincial
government.77 Following the settlement, Canadian Prime Minister
69. See Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFF. CAN., http://
www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff
/gov.aspx?lang=eng [http://perma.cc/LLS4-7N6M] (last modified Apr. 7, 2016). International
investment disputes are not reported with the same transparency as federal cases. While
the Canadian government maintains a transparent and up-to-date website of its claims,
identifying claims against the United States and Mexico involve searching out more
comprehensive lists of disputes than those maintained by the respective governments.
70. See Todd Weiler, Disputes with Mexico, NAFTACLAIMS.COM, http://www.naftaclaims
.com/disputes-with-mexico.html [https://perma.cc/Q5SC-8H57] [hereinafter Disputes with
Mexico].
71. See Todd Weiler, Disputes with USA, NAFTACLAIMS.COM, http://www
.naftaclaims.com/disputes-with-usa.html [https://perma.cc/62CE-3SL5] [hereinafter Disputes
with USA].
72. See Disputes with Mexico, supra note 70; Disputes with USA, supra note 71.
73. See Disputes with Mexico, supra note 70; Disputes with USA, supra note 71.
74. Twenty-one cases against Canada either were completed or are ongoing, while
sixteen were withdrawn or are inactive. Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada,
supra note 69. Of the former category, fourteen involved local action, while eight of the
latter category involved local action. Id.
75. See Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada: AbitibiBowater Inc. v.
Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFF. CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/AbitibiBowater.aspx?lang=eng
[http://perma.cc/SD87-D548].
76. Id.
77. Bertrand Marotte & John Ibbitson, Provinces on Hook for Future Trade Disputes:
Harper, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 26, 2010, 3:49 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com
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Stephen Harper said he would consider legislation to create such a
mechanism if provincial governments continued to act irresponsibly.78
Only five out of the twenty cases—25%—against the United
States involve local action.79 These claims, however, challenge a
number of different U.S. states and a wide range of regulatory
activity. Several of them challenged environmental regulations in
California,80 while one challenged Mississippi state court rulings
concerning funeral parlors.81 Another challenged a Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decision holding that the claimant could not
recover for intentional torts committed by authorities in Boston.82 Yet
another case sought between $310 and $664 million on the grounds
that the master settlement agreement U.S. state attorneys general
entered into with the tobacco industry in the late 1990s—which
provided the most comprehensive regulation of the tobacco industry
at that time—discriminated against Canadian cigarette producers.83
For Mexico, six of its twenty claims involve local action, many
challenging zoning and environmental decisions.84
The WTO has also seen its share of claims challenging local
action. Out of 502 cases filed to date, at least forty-one have
challenged subnational action (including, as explained below, claims
against EU member states)—a bit more than eight percent of cases.85
/report-on-business/provinces-on-hook-in-future-trade-disputes-harper/article1378647/ [http://
perma.cc/5N97-GQSR] (noting Canada’s lack of such a mechanism and the potential need
to create one in the future).
78. Id.
79. See Disputes with USA, supra note 71.
80. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, at 26–32 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Tri. June 8, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4TZQ-V65Z]; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 3–8
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0529.pdf [http://perma.cc/WB3G-HTAL].
81. See Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award,
¶ 3 (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005).
82. See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award,
¶¶ 1, 139–40 (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 182 (2004).
83. See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 1 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0384
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWZ7-LNEK].
84. See Disputes with Mexico, supra note 70.
85. To access the underlying data for this analysis, see Chronological List of Dispute
Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e
.htm [https://perma.cc/GM3L-DXF3]. I arrived at this number by examining the requests
for consultations in WTO disputes, current as of January 2016. This number may
underestimate the number of disputes involving local measures if a party did not name a
local measure in its request for consultations. I also followed the WTO’s system of
numbering disputes, counting each dispute to which the WTO gave an individual number
as an individual dispute, even if two disputes were linked. Thus, for example, I counted the
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Fourteen of those cases challenged action taken by provinces or states
within federal countries. Moreover, thirteen of these cases were
brought against the United States or Canada (the last targeted
provincial measures in Belgium).86 The EU and Japan, for example,
challenged a Massachusetts law that prohibited the state from
procuring goods or services from anyone doing business with, or in,
Myanmar.87 In the famous Gambling88 case, Antigua and Barbuda
successfully challenged allegedly discriminatory limitations on the
provision of online gambling services from outside the United States
(given that gambling is legal within the United States). Antigua and
Barbuda named laws in each of the fifty states, as well as Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.89 Finally, a number of
disputes challenged state and provincial subsidies for industries such
as aircrafts and renewable energy.90
Outside of North America, twenty-eight cases challenged actions
by EU member states.91 EU member states function in trade and
investment matters more as subnational units of a federal state than
as independent nations. Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the EU, which came into effect in 2009, provides that trade in
goods, trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual
property, and foreign direct investment are all part of the EU’s
common commercial policy.92 The common commercial policy, in
EU’s and Japan’s challenges to Ontario’s Feed-in Tariff Program as two disputes because
the WTO gave the disputes two numbers (DS412 and DS426).
86. See Request for Consultations by the Russian Federation, European Union and Its
Member States—Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, ¶¶ 2–5, WTO Doc.
WT/DS476/1 (Apr. 30, 2015) [hereinafter EU—Energy].
87. See Request for Consultations by Japan, United States—Measure Affecting
Government Procurement, at 1, WTO Doc. GPA/D3/1 WT/DS95/1 (July 18, 1997). This
issue was resolved on supremacy clause grounds in litigation in the United States. See
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
88. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc.
WT/DS285/1 (Apr. 1, 2003).
89. Id. Annex I & II.
90. See Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 23, ¶ 5.85; U.S.—Aircraft, supra note
24, at 567; Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities and
Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶¶ 1–6, WTO
Doc. WT/DS347/1 (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter EC—Aircraft].
91. One case, Request for Consultations by the Russian Federation, European Union
and its Member States, at 1–3, WTO Doc. WT/DS476/1 (May 8, 2014), challenged both EU
member states’ actions, as well as actions within an EU member state, Belgium. As a
consequence, this case counts as both a challenge to a provincial measure and an EU
member state. This explains why there are forty-one local WTO cases, but twenty-eight
such cases against EU member states and fourteen against regional actors.
92. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 207, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 140.
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turn, is a matter of EU exclusive competence, meaning that the EU
has jurisdiction and its member states do not.93 Nevertheless, just as
U.S. states and Canadian provinces can trigger claims against their
national governments, so too can EU member states trigger claims
against the EU.94 Not surprisingly, these claims look very similar to
those claims against North American state and provincial
governments. They involve, for example, subsidies for aircraft
manufacturers;95 energy regulation, including cases regarding
renewable energy markets;96 a handful of product regulations, such as
limitations on asbestos or the products made from seal skins;97 and
challenges to tax measures.98

93. Allan Rosas, EU External Relations: Exclusive Competence Revisited, 38
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1073, 1081 (2015) (“It thus became clear that these areas are
included in the concept of common commercial policy and thus are covered by TFEU
Article 3(1)(e), providing for an exclusive competence in the area of ‘common commercial
policy.”).
94. Whether a claim is or was brought against the EU or a member state directly
depends on the allocation of authority between the EU and its member states at the time
the challenge is brought. This allocation of authority, regarding both international
economic policy and defending international claims, has shifted over time. See Frank
Hoffmeister, Litigating Against the European Union and Its Member States—Who
Responds Under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International
Organizations?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 723, 724 (2010) (describing the international law rules
for responsibility of claims between the European Union and its member states).
95. EC—Aircraft, supra note 90, ¶¶ 2–6; U.S.—Aircraft, supra note 24, ¶ 1348;
Request for Consultations by the European Union, United States—Conditional Tax
Incentives for Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ II, WTO Doc. WT/DS487/1 (Dec. 19, 2014).
96. See EU—Energy, supra note 86, at 2–5; Request for Consultations by Argentina,
European Union and Certain Member States—Certain Measures on the Importation and
Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, ¶¶ 1–11, WTO
Doc. WT/DS459/1 (Dec. 19, 2014).
97. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 58, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/1 (adopted Mar. 12, 2001);
Panel Reports, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 7.7, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/1 (adopted Nov. 25, 2013);
Request for Consultations by Norway, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶ 1–2, WTO Doc. WT/DS401/1 (Oct. 21,
2010).
98. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by the United States, France—Certain Income
Tax Measures Constituting Subsidies, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS131/1 (May 11, 1998);
Request for Consultations by the United States, Ireland—Certain Income Tax Measures
Constituting Subsidies, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS130/1 (May 11, 1998); Request for
Consultations by the United States, Greece—Certain Income Tax Measures Constituting
Subsidies, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS129/1 (May 11, 1998). These cases proceed against the
individual member states because tax policy is within the competence of individual EU
members.
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As this case law makes clear, strict vicarious liability is a rule
with teeth.99 Nations and private investors frequently challenge the
legality of the actions of local governments in other jurisdictions.
Frequently, they win. The national government is left holding the bag,
either paying compensation to investors or grappling with a
settlement or the possibility of countermeasures within the WTO.
Ironically, this very success in terms of creating means to adjudicate
international economic law disputes has put pressure on the system.
Vicarious liability has become much costlier for states now that they
can and are regularly called before tribunals to defend actions that
they themselves have not taken.100 Vicarious liability makes federal
nations, in particular, defense counsel for their local governments—a
position in which they may not wish to be.
B.

Immunity

In response to the surge in challenges to local action, national
governments in the twenty-first century have increasingly changed
their treaty practices to limit international responsibility for local
action. The overwhelming trend is to replace vicarious liability with
immunity for existing discriminatory measures.101 As used here,
immunity refers to a rule that exempts a state from liability it would
otherwise face. In this sense, immunity is broader than simply a
jurisdictional immunity from suit. It includes limitations on the
substantive application of international legal rules to local conduct.102

99. See Gerard Conway, Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of
Member States, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 679, 684–85 (2002) (describing vicarious liability for
member states arising from the actions of organizations belonging to the member state).
100. See Alan O. Sykes & Eric Posner, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual
Responsibility Under International Law 16–19 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 279, 2006), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1042&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/V2QK-B2JH] (extrapolating
the adverse economic effects on member states of vicarious liability).
101. See infra notes 131–37 and accompanying text.
102. The use of immunity in this broad sense, rather than merely jurisdictional
immunity, is significant because under international law, the notion of responsibility or
liability is completely divorced from the existence of a tribunal’s jurisdiction over a
dispute. Many, if not most, international agreements prohibit an international tribunal
from exercising jurisdiction over disputes. Jurisdiction exists only when states expressly
consent to it, which they usually do not. States remain responsible to each other, however,
for violations of international law. For example, the United States withdrew from the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) that granted
the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes. While this action removed the basis for jurisdiction, the
United States remains responsible under international law for violations of the VCCR. See
John Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal from International Court of Justice
Jurisdiction in Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
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The 2004 U.S. Model BIT offers an illustrative example of a
treaty provision that creates immunity for local action. Article 14,
entitled “Non-Conforming Measures,” provides that the treaty’s rules
forbidding discrimination against foreign investors and investments
(nondiscrimination rules) do not apply to existing non-conforming
measures, or any amendment or renewal thereto, at the local level of
government or at the regional level of government if a party so
declares.103 In its BITs concluded since 2004, the United States has
declared that the treaties’ nondiscrimination rules do not apply to
“[a]ll existing non-conforming measures of all states of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.”104 Identical
provisions can be found in both the investment and services chapters
of recent multilateral trade agreements, such as the Central AmericaDominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”),105 as
well as bilateral trade agreements, such as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (“KORUS”),106 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement
(“U.S.-Australia FTA”),107 the U.S.-Colombia FTA,108 and the U.S.-

263, 263–64 (2009) (explaining the jurisdictional implications of United States’ withdrawal
from the VCCR).
103. See 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 14, http://www.state.gov
/documents/organization/117601.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8U5-AFGC]. Specifically, the
exemption applies to the national treatment obligation, the most-favored nation
obligation, the ban on performance requirements, and nondiscrimination rules with
respect to senior management and boards of directors. Id.arts. 3–4, 8–9. This language was
carried forward to the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. See 2012 U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 14, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS93-B68N].
104. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, Rwanda-U.S., Annex I, art. 14, Feb. 19, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 12-101; Treaty
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Uru.-U.S.,
Annex I, Nov. 4, 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101 [hereinafter Uruguay-U.S. BIT]. The United
States has also attempted to contract out of international responsibility for state actions in
non-economic areas through so-called “federalism reservations.” These reservations
purport to exclude from the United States’ obligations any actions for which the U.S.
Constitution allocates authority to the states. See U.S. Ratification of United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime ¶ 1, ratified Nov. 3, 2005, 2346
U.N.T.S. 440 (“The United States of America reserves the right to assume obligations
under the Convention in a manner consistent with its fundamental principles of
federalism . . . .”).
105. Free Trade Agreement, Cent. Am.-Dom. Rep.-U.S., arts. 10.13, 11.6, 12.9, Jan. 28,
2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004).
106. Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., arts. 11.12, 12.6, 13.9, Annex I, June 30, 2007
[hereinafter KORUS FTA], http://www.wipo.int/edocs/trtdocs/en/kr-us/trt_kr_us.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZB5V-3SQK].
107. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., arts. 10.6, 11.13, 13.8, Annex I-Australia-2,
Annex I-United States-12, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 (2004) [hereinafter Austl.-U.S.
FTA].
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Chile FTA,109 among others. The culmination of this trend in U.S.
practice is the inclusion of identical provisions in the investment and
services chapters of the TPP.110
Significantly, in most of these agreements the United States is
the only party to make a declaration with respect to regional levels of
government. The exceptions are the U.S.-Australia FTA, where both
parties exempted all regional measures,111 and the TPP, where
Australia, Canada, Mexico, and the United States all adopted this
approach.112 As a result, all parties to these agreements receive
immunity for the acts of truly local governments. However, the
United States (along with the other federal nations in the TPP)
receives an additional exemption for state and provincial
governments.113
The significance of this distinction in a federal country cannot be
overstated. The scope of regulatory activity at the U.S. state level is
massive. For example, professional licensing is done almost entirely at
the state level in the United States.114 Licensing schemes restrict who
can provide certain services,115 and therefore have significant
implications for efforts to liberalize trade in services. The immunity
provisions that are now standard in economic treaties insulate
discriminatory aspects of licensing schemes from challenge in
perpetuity, so long as they are not allowed to lapse. The same can be
said of zoning and land-use ordinances, which are local laws. These
provisions have been the source of a number of investment disputes,
especially against Mexico.116 Once again, so long as they remain in

108. Trade Promotion Agreement, Colom.-U.S., arts. 10.13, 11.6, 12.9, Annex I-US-13,
Nov. 22, 2006, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/finaltext [https://perma.cc/6E3D-K4MF].
109. Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., arts. 10.7, 11.6, 12.9 & Annex I-US-14, June 6,
2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003).
110. See TPP, supra note 10, arts. 9.12 & 10.7.
111. Austl.-U.S. FTA, supra note 107, arts. 10.6, 11.13, Annex I-Australia-2, Annex IUnited States 12.
112. See TPP, supra note 10, arts. 9.12, 10.7 & Annex I.
113. See id.
114. Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014) (“[N]early a
third of American workers need a state license to perform their job legally, and this trend
toward licensing is continuing. The service sector—the most likely to be covered by
licensing—has grown enormously, with its share of nonfarm employment growing from
roughly 40% in 1950 to over 60% in 2007.”).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 74–112 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 209 (2002) (holding that
Mexico violated NAFTA chapter 11’s fair and equitable treatment and expropriation

95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017)

2017]

LOCAL LIABILITY IN INT’L ECON. LAW

283

effect, discriminatory aspects of those schemes are immune to
challenge under the TPP or its ilk. Indeed, in the United States the
states are thought to have plenary police powers, while the federal
government is one of enumerated powers. Although the reality is
somewhat different—the modern federal government has successfully
regulated nearly everything it has tried to regulate—the fact remains
that the daily operations of businesses and lives of ordinary people
remain more closely tied to state and local laws. Exempting those
laws from challenge thus creates a major hole in the
nondiscrimination provisions of economic treaties.
The relative size of the exempted economies provides another
clue as to the scope of the exemptions immunity creates. A
comparison of nominal GDP data indicates that California alone has
the sixth largest economy in the world, exceeding the economies of
Brazil, India, Russia, and France.117 Indeed, California’s GDP exceeds
all other TPP signatories’ except for Japan.118 Texas and New York
equal or exceed the GDPs of all TPP signatories except Japan,
Canada, and Australia.119 Excluding Japan and the four federal TPP
nations, nineteen U.S. states have annual nominal GDPs that exceed
the next largest TPP economy, Singapore.120 The top three Canadian
provinces—Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta—all have higher GDPs
than half of the TPP’s signatories.121
As a result, immunity creates asymmetric pressure on nations to
liberalize their economies. Immunity exempts an enormous swath of
local laws in federal countries from nondiscrimination rules. The
exempted laws cover state and provincial economies that in many
cases dwarf the economies of small, less developed, centralized
provisions through the actions of its subnational governments in denying permits for a
landfill).
117. Compare Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State (Millions of Current Dollars),
U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/drilldown.cfm?reqid=70&stepnum
=11&AreaTypeKeyGdp=5&GeoFipsGdp=XX&ClassKeyGdp=NAICS&ComponentKey
=200&IndustryKey=1&YearGdp=2015Q2&YearGdpBegin=-1&YearGdpEnd=-1&UnitOf
MeasureKeyGdp=Levels&RankKeyGdp=1&Drill=1&nRange=5 [https://perma.cc/MYT4GBQD] [hereinafter 2015 State GDP] (listing U.S. state GDPs for 2015), with Gross
Domestic Product 2014, WORLD BANK [hereinafter 2014 World GDP], https://
web.archive.org/web/20160624102936/http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ4F-BRWX] (listing national GDPs for 2014).
118. Compare 2015 State GDP, supra note 117, with 2014 World GDP, supra note 117.
119. Compare 2015 State GDP, supra note 117, with 2014 World GDP, supra note 117.
120. Compare 2015 State GDP, supra note 117, with 2014 World GDP, supra note 117.
121. Compare 2014 World GDP, supra note 117, with Gross Domestic Product,
Expenditure-Based, by Province and Territory, STAT. CAN., http://www.statcan.gc.ca
/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/econ15-eng.htm [https://perma.cc/8DL5-UGQA] (last
modified Nov. 10, 2015).
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nations. Yet these same centralized countries have no similar
comprehensive exemption for discriminatory regulations—such as
professional licensing regimes—that they promulgate at the central
level of government.122 Indeed, the sweeping nature of the U.S.
declaration of exemption for its states caused South Korea to demand
the inclusion of an illustrative list of exempted state-level measures in
the KORUS Agreement.123
To be sure, these provisions do not create all-encompassing
immunity. First, the immunity applies only to the treaty’s
nondiscrimination rules.124 Rules on expropriation and a minimum
standard of treatment are fully applicable, for example.125 This
limitation is important, but discrimination claims are often easier for a
challenger to win. Tribunals may be more comfortable finding that a
government acted unlawfully when the government itself establishes
the applicable standard of conduct through its behavior towards
similarly situated parties. For example, in Feldman v. Mexico,126 an
American company challenged Mexico’s inconsistent application of
tax rebates for the export of gray market cigarettes.127 The tribunal
rejected Feldman’s expropriation claim, while nevertheless
acknowledging that Feldman had been treated “in a less than
reasonable manner.”128 Yet on the same facts the tribunal ruled in
favor of Feldman on his discrimination claim, since a similarly
situated Mexican company received more favorable treatment than
Feldman.129
Second, these exemptions on their face apply only to nonconforming measures in existence at the time the treaty comes into
force. All new local action is fully subject to the treaty’s rules. While a
significant limitation on the scope of immunity, amendments or
reenactments of existing measures are also immunized from

122. To be sure, each country does have an opportunity to enter its own list of
exemptions. Countries often, for example, tailor their commitments in the financial
services sector. They do not, however, take the across-the-board geographic approach to
exemptions taken by federal countries.
123. KORUS FTA, supra note 106, art. 11.12 ¶¶ 1–5.
124. See TPP, supra note 10, arts. 9.12, 10.7.
125. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 10, art. 9.12 (stating that the non-conforming provisions
apply only to the National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, Performance
Requirements, and Senior Management and Boards of Directors provisions).
126. Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶ 1
(Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 341 (2005).
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 113.
129. Id. ¶ 188.
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challenge.130 In practice, then, savvy local governments (or national
governments defending suits) can relate their new discriminatory acts
to non-conforming acts existing at the treaty’s entry into force. This
introduces another asymmetry. Sophisticated governments can design
their discriminatory actions to take advantage of the exception for
renewals, amendments, and modifications. Unsophisticated
governments, even in federal states, are unlikely to follow suit.
Practically speaking, the result will be that large, wealthy regional
governments, such as California and Ontario, are likely to benefit
more from immunity than are small, poor regional governments.
Critically, immunity for local action is not limited to U.S. treaty
practice. Other federal nations regularly include similar provisions in
their economic treaties. Canada’s 2004 Model BIT contains a
provision substantially similar to article 14 of the U.S. Model BIT.131
Similarly, India added a new exemption for truly local government
action in its 2015 Model BIT.132 The Canada-EU Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”) includes a similar
provision exempting all truly local measures and listed measures at
the provincial and EU member state level, although neither Canada
nor the EU entered blanket exemptions for the latter.133 The 2015
Australia-China FTA exempts existing local and listed regional
measures for services.134 For investment, however, the agreement
exempts all local and regional measures for Australia, and all existing
non-conforming measures in all of China, including central
government measures.135 The Canada-China FTA contains a similar
provision, although the exemption for existing non-conforming
130. 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 103, art. 14(b)–(c).
131. 2004 Model Canadian Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 9, http://www.italaw.com
/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/59V7-B26L] (providing
that the treaty’s nondiscrimination rules shall not apply to measures adopted by subnational governments, where sub-national governments are defined to include both local
and regional governments).
132. Compare 2015 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 2.4(i),
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/investment_diviion/ModelBIT_Annex.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XM6-BCUP] (providing that the “Treaty shall not apply to any measure
by a local government”), with 2003 Indian Model Text of BIPA, http://www.italaw.com
/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5Q3-W8PY] (containing no
such language).
133. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, arts. 8.15(1)(a),
9.7(1)(a), 13.10(1)(a), 13.10(2)(a), 14.4(1)(a), Oct. 30, 2016 [hereinafter Canada-EU Trade
Agreement], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U39M-5KFJ].
134. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-China, art. 8.9, Nov. 17, 2014, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3454 [https://perma.cc/NJC3-K7UA].
135. Id. art. 9.5.
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measures applies to all such measures in both countries.136 China, in
other words, demands complete exemption for all its existing nonconforming measures as the price for agreeing to federal states’
immunity for sub-national actions. As one of the world’s largest
markets, China is in a position to extract concessions from other
countries in a way that countries with smaller markets—such as
Central and South American states—are not.137
Finally, some states follow a “positive list” approach in trade
negotiations. Under the positive list approach, the default rule is that
economic activity is not covered by liberalization commitments unless
a state specifically opts into it.138 In effect, a positive list approach
makes immunity the default rule and state responsibility the
exception. The positive list approach is often associated with the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).139 The GATS
divides obligations into “General Obligations and Disciplines” and
“Specific Commitments.”140 The General Obligations and
Disciplines—which include the most favored nation obligation—
create state responsibility across the board.141
The Specific Commitments—which include the national
treatment obligation not to discriminate in favor of one’s own
nationals—applies only to sectors into which states opt.142 By opting
in, federal states can limit their commitments in regard to local
governments. For example, many of the United States’ commitments
136. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Can.-China, art. 8.2, Sept. 9, 2014, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download
/TreatyFile/3476 [https://perma.cc/24U4-MKYN]. Articles 5–7 do not apply to any existing
non-conforming measures maintained within the territory of a contracting party. See id.
arts. 5–7.
137. China’s exemption for all existing non-conforming measures seems to be a
standard provision in its trade agreements. The exemption appears in agreements, such as
the China-South Korea FTA, that do not involve federal countries. See, e.g., Free Trade
Agreement, China-S. Kor., art. 12.3, Jun. 1, 2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org
/Download/TreatyFile/3461 [https://perma.cc/KGJ9-HY9H] (“Paragraph 1 [National
Treatment] shall not apply to non-conforming measures, if any, existing at the date of
entry into force of this Chapter . . . .”).
138. See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in
Search of a Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 111 (2003) (describing the positive
list approach).
139. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter
GATS].
140. Id. Annex 1B.
141. Id.
142. Id. art. XX, ¶ 1 (“Each Member shall set out in a schedule the specific
commitments it undertakes . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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in its GATS schedule include limitations based on state law.143 Other
agreements, such as the WTO’s Agreement on Government
Procurement, follow a similar approach.144 The positive list approach
does not target local action specifically. However, by limiting those
local measures listed or carving out local measures from more general
commitments, as is done in the United States’ GATS schedule,
countries can use the positive list approach to achieve the same effect
as under immunity.
Taken together, these provisions suggest that large federal
nations now routinely exempt their local governments from the
nondiscrimination rules in investment and trade in services
agreements. These provisions, however, have significant asymmetric
components. For federal states, they exempt significant amounts of
regulation applying to large regional economies. Moreover, powerful,
relatively centralized countries like China have met this demand with
even broader exceptions to its liberalization commitments. Smaller
centralized states, however, receive no similar exemption. Immunity
thus risks reinforcing the view that international economic law
perpetuates or even exacerbates existing inequalities.
C.

Direct Liability

Direct liability against local governments—in which a claimant
can challenge the local government itself—is international law’s third,
and rarest, liability rule.145 As practiced, direct liability has two
components: (1) the local government is itself responsible for the
breach of international obligations and (2) jurisdiction exists over the
local government at least to the extent it exists over the national
government.
Direct liability in international law generally takes the form of
joint and several liability, meaning that the national government
retains responsibility for the local government to the extent the
former does not resolve any liability arising from its violations. Joint
and several liability can work in at least two ways. In some cases, such
as local responsibility under the ICSID Convention, a claim can
proceed directly against a local government.146 In these cases, the
143. See, e.g., id. Annex on Financial Services ¶ 2 (listing state law limitations on
market access and national treatment commitments in the financial services sector).
144. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter
GPA].
145. See infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
146. ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 25(1).
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national government’s international responsibility still exists, but it is
satisfied by a judgment against the local government.147 Moreover,
jurisdiction may not exist over the national government. The local
government may have consented to arbitrate an investment dispute
with an investor, while the national government may not have. In
other cases, such as the EU and its member states’ liability under the
WTO Agreements, jurisdiction exists over both the superior and
subordinate governments and, in theory, both can be held
responsible.148 The key idea, however, is that under direct liability, the
local government itself is subject to claims, even if the national
government may evade a tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Like immunity, creating direct liability requires a treaty
provision. Article 25 of the ICSID Convention is perhaps the most
important such provision in a multilateral agreement. The ICSID
Convention established the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) as an institution affiliated with the
World Bank and charged ICSID with resolving investment disputes
between states and foreign investors.149 Article 25 states,
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the Centre by that State) and the national of
another Contracting State . . . .150
Thus, member states can permit their local governments (or other
units) to act as respondents for cases involving their own actions.151

147. Id. art. 53(1) (“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject
to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.”).
148. See GPA, supra note 144, arts. XI, XIV (describing how European member states
and the European communities (now the EU) can both become WTO members).
149. See ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 1 (“There is hereby established the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes . . . .”).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. The local government itself must still consent to the claim, just as the national
government would have to. Id. art. 25(3) (“Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency
of a Contracting State shall require the approval of that State unless that State notifies the
Centre that no such approval is required.”). In Cable Television of Nevis Ltd. v. Federation
of St. Kitts and Nevis, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/2, Award (Jan. 13, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep.
106 (2002), an ICSID tribunal declined to find jurisdiction in a suit against the Nevis Island
Administration (NIA), a subdivision of St. Kitts and Nevis. Id. ¶ 2.33. Although the NIA
had included an ICSID arbitration clause in its agreement with the complainant, St. Kitts
and Nevis had neither designated the NIA as capable of participating directly nor
consented to its participation. Id.; see also LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL
BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 33 (2d ed. 2011).
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States avail themselves of this opportunity infrequently, however.152
Only twelve states have notified ICSID that subunits may participate
directly in claims.153 Of these, eight states’ notifications deal only with
commercial agencies (primarily state-owned oil companies).154
The four states that have consented to claims directly against
their subunits are Australia, Canada, Indonesia, and the United
Kingdom.155 Of these four, Australia and Canada are the most
interesting.156 Australia, a federal nation consisting of six states and
two territories, consented in 1991 to direct suits against both of its
territories and five out of its six states.157 Canada, long a notable
holdout from the ICSID Convention, consented to suits against three
of its provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario) shortly after
it finally ratified the ICSID Convention in 2014.158 As discussed
above, suits directly against Canadian provinces became an especially
important issue after the AbitibiBowater settlement, with the
Canadian federal government stating that it may pursue a mechanism
152. Even when states create direct liability, they remain internationally responsible
for their local governments’ actions barring a treaty provision to the contrary. A
designation under article 25 of the ICSID Convention is about jurisdiction, although the
enforcement provisions of the ICSID Convention mean that the local government has
substantive liability as well. See ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 25.
153. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Contracting States
and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention, ICSID/8-C, at 2–3 (May
2016) [hereinafter ICSID/8-C], https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs
/Documents/ICSID%208-Contracting%20States%20and%20Measures%20Taken%20by
%20Them%20for%20the%20Purpose%20of%20the%20Convention.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2NME-27A3].
154. Id. Ecuador had also given consent to suit against several state-owned enterprises.
Ecuador withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2010, however. See Fernando Cabrera
Diaz, Ecuador Prepares for Life After ICSID, While Debate Continues over Effect of Its
Exit from the Centre, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/08
/28/ecuador-prepares-for-life-after-icsid-while-debate-continues-over-effect-of-its-exitfrom-the-centre/ [https://perma.cc/G6N7-2ZNM].
155. ICSID/8-C, supra note 153, at 1–3.
156. Indonesia’s consent relates only to a single local government, while the United
Kingdom’s relates to a number of its former colonies for which it continues to have
international responsibility, such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. See id. at 2–3.
157. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Contracting States
and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention, ICSID/8-A, at 1 (May
2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/ICSID%208Contracting%20States%20and%20Measures%20Taken%20by%20Them%20for%20the
%20Purpose%20of%20the%20Convention.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NME-27A3]. The lone
exception is the sparsely populated province of Western Australia. See ICSID/8-C, supra
note 153, at 1. Interestingly, Western Australia’s economy is based heavily on the
extractive sector, from which many investment claims arise. See RESOURCE CURSE OR
CURE? ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA 1 (Martin
Bruekner et al. eds., 2014).
158. ICSID/8-C, supra note 153, at 2.
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to allow it to recoup the costs of successful claims against it based on
provincial action.159 Direct liability under the ICSID Convention
provides such a mechanism, one that does not require domestic
legislation.
The EU and its member states provide a more complicated
example of direct liability. Of course, EU member states such as
France and Germany are sovereign nations each with international
legal personality in their own right.160 Historically, the EU and its
member states are often both party to international economic
agreements such as the WTO Agreements.161 When both the EU and
its member states are party to an economic agreement, both can be
internationally responsible for a breach of the agreement.162 Both are
usually subject to jurisdiction under an economic agreement’s dispute
resolution provisions as well.163 Under the WTO’s dispute settlement
system, for example, complainants often name both the EU and the
relevant member states in cases involving actions by the member
states.164
More recent free trade agreements give the EU the opportunity
to tell a complainant which level of government will serve as
respondent.165 CETA, the Canada-EU free trade agreement, provides
that prior to initiating an investor-state arbitration, a claimant must
“deliver to the European Union a notice requesting a determination
of the respondent.”166 In the event that the EU does not make a
determination within fifty days, the EU is the default respondent
unless all of the challenged measures originate in a member state.167
This approach retains a greater role for the member states than
the EU itself initially (and perhaps ultimately) envisioned. In 2010,
the European Commission (the EU’s executive body) published its
views on a future common investment law policy.168 The commission

159. Marotte & Ibbitson, supra note 77; see also supra Section I.A.
160. Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1
CHI. J. INT’L L. 273, 274 (2000).
161. Id. at 275.
162. See Eva Steinberger, The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the
EC’s and the EC Member States’ Membership of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 837, 838
(2006).
163. See id.
164. See, e.g., EC—Aircraft, supra note 90, ¶¶ 1–6.
165. Canada-EU Trade Agreement, supra note 133, art. 8.21.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—
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indicated that it believed itself to have exclusive competence for
foreign direct investment under the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.169 The commission took “the view that the
European Union will also be the sole defendant regarding any
measure taken by a Member State which affects investments by third
country nationals or companies falling within the scope of the
agreement concerned.”170 Despite its desire to be the sole defendant,
however, the Commission was less enthusiastic about the financial
responsibility that usually accompanies that role, indicating that it
would pursue new legislation to allocate fiscal responsibility.171
Recognizing that EU member states also have hundreds of BITs in
force that make no mention of the EU, the Commission put forward
legislation to govern the relationship between the EU and member
states regarding BITs.172 In particular, even though member states
remain primarily responsible, the regulation requires member states
to consult with the EU in the event they are named a respondent,
permit the EU’s participation as necessary, and initiate proceedings at
the EU’s request.173
Other federal systems offer additional examples of the direct role
subnational governments can play in international legal affairs. A
number of constitutions of federal nations—including Germany,174
Switzerland,175 and Belgium176—grant subnational governments the
right to enter into treaties on matters within the scope of their
authority. While violations of such treaties might still give rise to

Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, at 2, COM (2010)
343 final (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter Comprehensive European Investment Policy].
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 10.
171. See id.
172. See Commission Regulation 1219/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 40.
173. Id. at 44.
174. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 32(3) (Ger.), translation at http://www
.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/TL2T-9QYK] (“Insofar as
the Länder have power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with foreign states with the
consent of the Federal Government.”).
175. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 56, para.
1 (Switz.), translated in FED. COUNCIL, FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SWISS
CONFEDERATION 14 (June 14, 2015), https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation
/19995395/201506140000/101.pdf [https://perma.cc/X89V-CGQC] (“A Canton may conclude
treaties with foreign states on matters that lie within the scope of its powers.”).
176. 1994 CONST. art. 127 (Belg.), translated in BELG. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE BELGIAN CONSTITUTION 37 (2009), https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Belgium_const
_1994.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA73-CK9U] (“The Parliaments of the Flemish and French
communities . . . regulate by federate law . . . cooperation between the Communities, as
well as international cooperation, including the concluding of treaties . . . .”).
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international responsibility for the parent-state, they also create
responsibility for the subnational government concluding the treaty.177
Other countries, such as the United States, expressly forbid
treaties between subnational governments and foreign countries.178
As Duncan Hollis has demonstrated, however, U.S. states regularly
enter into compacts with foreign nations on a wide range of issues
without congressional consent or even reporting the compacts to the
federal government.179 Likewise, in Canada the federal executive
branch has sole responsibility for negotiating and concluding
treaties.180 Nevertheless, Canadian provinces such as Quebec maintain
their own set of “government offices” in a range of cities around the
world, and Canadian provinces participated directly in the trade
negotiations with the EU that led to CETA.181
While these practices of U.S. states and Canadian provinces do
not lead to international responsibility for those entities, they do
indicate a robust level of participation in international relations.
Moreover, they indicate a sophisticated capacity to engage in
legalized international relationships. Coupled with the increasingly
federalized nature of the EU, these examples demonstrate that legal
personality and legal responsibility can and do filter down to multiple
layers of government in the modern world. Direct liability is the
logical extension of these trends. While uncommon to date, it appears
both in coalescing federal systems like the EU, as well as established
ones like Canada. In both cases, direct liability is a testament to the
tension between local government’s freedom of action in federal
systems and the international obligations that those local
governments bear.
* * *

177. By signing the treaty, other states recognize that the subnational government has
legal personality for purposes of the treaty, thereby giving rise to responsibility. See Allan
Rosas, The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU Member
States, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1304, 1343–35 (2011).
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation . . . .”).
179. See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 749–
55, 759 (2010). The U.S. Constitution permits states to enter into “compact[s,]” but not
treaties, so long as Congress provides its consent. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
180. Gerald P. Heckman, International Human Rights Law Norms and Discretionary
Powers: Recent Developments, 16 CANADIAN J. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 31, 33 n.5 (2002)
(“The federal executive may exercise its prerogative powers to enter into international
treaties that bind Canada on the international plane . . . .”).
181. See Pierre Marc Johnson, Patrick Muzzi & Veronique Bastien, The Voice of
Quebec in the CETA Negotiations, 68 INT’L J. 560, 561 (2013) (discussing Quebec’s
participation in the international trade negotiations that led to CETA).
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The conventional wisdom that nation-states do or should answer
for the actions of their local governments is under stress. The rise of
robust dispute resolution and compulsory jurisdiction in international
economic law has brought a wave of claims against national
governments based on local action. Nations have responded by
creating exemptions for local action—exemptions that frequently
benefit federal states more than non-federal states. The trend in
international law has thus been away from the strict vicarious liability
of national governments and towards immunity from claims based on
local action. At the same time, however, a nascent system of direct
liability has emerged as a possible rival to immunity. Below, each of
these liability rules is evaluated, both from the standpoint of states as
well as from the standpoint of general welfare.
II. EVALUATING LOCAL LIABILITY RULES
In order to make sense of the trend towards immunity for local
action, we first must have an idea of how well liability rules perform
their underlying function. This Part evaluates three liability rules in
light of the two key purposes of liability: (1) providing incentives for
governments to comply with the law (litigation’s regulatory function)
and (2) ensuring the availability of relief to a successful claimant
(litigation’s compensatory function). Direct liability provides better
incentives for compliance than vicarious liability, although vicarious
liability may provide greater relief for claimants. However, in a
vacuum, direct liability is superior to vicarious liability because better
regulation of conduct will reduce the need for compensation.
Immunity performs the worst of these three rules under both criteria.
This result creates a puzzle: why are governments moving from a
relatively effective liability rule to one that fails to achieve liability’s
aim? Part III turns to that question.
A. Incentivizing Compliance
From an economic point of view, efficient liability rules impose
the total costs (and benefits) of an action on the actor, whether or not
the actor feels the effect directly.182 An actor that internalizes the
costs and benefits of its actions in this way will act in a way that

182. See Allan M. Feldman & John M. Frost, A Simple Model of Efficient Tort Liability
Rules, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 201, 212 (1998) (noting that standard efficient tort
liability rules can be applied to situations with multiple defendants).
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maximizes global welfare.183 In this way, liability serves a regulatory
function: it creates prospective incentives for actors to behave in the
interest of the general welfare. In domestic law, this internalization
principle is familiar. Its logic is clearest when examining the theory of
efficient breach of contract. There, the imposition of expectation
damages ensures that the plaintiff is made whole for the harm she
suffers as a result of the defendant’s conduct.184 Expectation damages
should therefore cause a defendant to internalize the costs of its
breach of contract. Knowing that it faces efficient expectation
damages, the defendant will only breach the contract if the gains it
privately captures exceed the costs its actions create for potential
plaintiffs.185
Two variables affect a liability rule’s ability to incentivize
government compliance: (1) whether the liability rule leads to the
actual violating party paying the costs of its action and (2) the
likelihood that a claimant will bring a challenge. As explained below,
direct liability forces the acting government to internalize the costs of
its actions. On the other hand, vicarious liability and immunity both
allow the acting government to externalize its costs. Moreover, direct
liability is unlikely to reduce the likelihood of investment claims,
although it would marginally reduce the probability of claims
challenging local action in trade law.

183. In the liability context, actors are typically expected to internalize the costs of
their actions to avoid an oversupply of costly conduct. Legal rules should also, however,
reward actors for benefits they create that they do not directly capture. Otherwise, actors
undersupply the beneficial conduct. See Meyer, supra note 40, at 1987.
184. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 694 (1986) (“A rule of expectation damages, for
instance, completely insures the promisee against loss . . . .”).
185. Id. at 701. In other areas of the law, different damages rules are designed to
accomplish the same purpose. Punitive damages, for example, can be understood as an
effort to impose efficient damages on a tortfeasor that likely does not face liability for
each individual tort committed. See generally A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) (discussing the
deterrence rationale for the imposition of punitive damages). If the tortfeasor commits ten
torts that each cause $1,000 worth of harm but only one victim brings suit, an efficient
damages award compensates the victim $1,000 and also awards punitive damages of at
least $9,000 to guarantee that the tortfeasor does not profit from the tortious actions.
Faced with an efficient damages award, the tortfeasor must take into account the social
costs of those tortious actions. See id. In civil procedure, aggregate litigation performs this
function. Class actions allow small claims to be brought in a single suit so that a defendant
cannot escape liability simply because the harms it causes individual victims is too small to
justify a lawsuit. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677–79 (outlining economic and social
justifications for class action suits).
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1. Internalizing Costs
Direct liability best fulfills the regulatory purpose of litigation. It
forces the actor actually breaching an obligation to internalize the
costs of its actions.186 The mechanism through which direct liability
forces cost internalization differs between trade and investment law.
In investment law, dispute resolution is between a private party on
the one hand, and a state on the other.187 Moreover, an award in an
investment dispute results in monetary damages that impose the costs
of discrimination on the local government.188
Trade law is more complicated. Trade disputes are between two
states and do not result in financial penalties.189 Instead, under trade
law a successful claimant suspends concessions.190 For example, a
claimant might receive permission to raise tariffs on computers from
the violating state above the level permitted by the relevant WTO
Agreement (here, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) or
the goods chapter of a free trade agreement such as the TPP.191
These concessions, in turn, are made at the national level.
California, for example, will not specifically receive concessions from
Japan if and when the United States joins the TPP. In principle, this
could make targeting the suspension of concessions at a local
government, as direct liability would require, difficult. Japan could
not raise tariffs on computers from California specifically, only on
computers from the United States. Nevertheless, a trade agreement

186. Cf. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings”
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 37 (2003) (noting in the context of land use cases that the
“fact that liability [under NAFTA] for violations of the agreements is imposed on the
signatory state, rather than directly on its local governments or regulatory agencies, makes
such internalization especially unlikely”).
187. See ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 25 (“The jurisdiction of the Centre
shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a
Contracting State . . . and a national of another Contracting State . . . .”).
188. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 103, art. 24.
189. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 22, ¶ 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (“The WTO shall provide
the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members
in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the
Annexes to this Agreement.”).
190. Id.
191. Id. (“If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent
with a covered agreement into compliance[,] . . . any party having invoked the dispute
settlement procedures may request authorization from the [Dispute Settlment Body] to
suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreements.”).
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could initially permit only the suspension of concessions that would
predominantly affect the offending local government.
Only if those concessions were inadequate would a foreign
government be permitted to suspend concessions that affect the
nation more broadly. This geographic approach to trade retaliation
has precedent in current trade law. Under the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), suspended concessions should
come from the same sector as that in which the violation occurred.192
If the claimant believes limiting its suspending concessions in this
fashion would be impractical or ineffective, it may look first to other
sectors under the same agreement, and then to retaliation under other
agreements (e.g., services or intellectual property), a concept known
as cross-retaliation.193
Faced with the costs of its action through these mechanisms, a
local government should only take the action if the benefits it gets
from breaching exceed the costs it imposes on others. Moreover,
knowing in advance that they can be called to account for their
actions, local governments will be more likely to educate themselves
both about their legal responsibilities and about the costs of their
actions on others outside their jurisdictions.194 Under vicarious
liability, local governments are often rationally ignorant of
international law. Lacking direct accountability under international
law, many local governments have little reason to invest resources in
learning what international law requires of them.195 Indeed, national
governments sometimes step in to educate local governments about
their responsibilities in the hopes of reducing violations.196 For
example, following the Avena decision, the U.S. State Department
undertook a campaign to educate local police forces about the Vienna

192. Id. at art. 22.3 (setting forth the rules on what concessions may be suspended).
193. Id.
194. International law increasingly requires nations to inform themselves of the crossborder impacts of their actions. See Daniel Kazhdan, Note, Precautionary Pulp: Pulp Mills
and the Evolving Dispute Between International Tribunals over the Reach of the
Precautionary Principle, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 527, 547 (2011). The ICJ declared in the Pulp
Mills case that a customary international law norm exists requiring countries to undertake
an environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) when economic activity might have crossborder effects. Id. The effectiveness of this emerging substantive norm, however, is limited
by the fact that the international law of state responsibility provides that only the nation is
liable for a breach of this norm. Local governments are thus not themselves directly
incentivized by international law to comply with the substantive rules on performing crossborder EIAs.
195. See Johanna Kalb, Dynamic Federalism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation,
84 TUL. L. REV. 1025, 1036–37 (2010).
196. Id. at 1039.
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Convention on Consular Relations’ (“VCCR”) requirements.197
Direct liability would solve this problem by providing local
governments with an incentive to proactively review their laws and
regulations to ensure their compatibility with international law.
Vicarious liability is second best from an internalization
standpoint. Under vicarious liability, local governments externalize
the costs of their actions onto national governments. Whether liability
deters breaches thus depends on whether national liability
incentivizes national governments to prospectively regulate unlawful
local programs. For example, when the United States lost a WTO
dispute about the legality of the U.S. State of Washington’s subsidies
for Boeing, the State of Washington—the actual breaching party—
received no direct penalty.198 Instead, the federal government risked
retaliation by the EU if it did not get Washington to come into
compliance or if it did not otherwise reach agreement with the EU.199
Consequently, U.S. states need not consider the costs of their actions
on others because the vicarious liability imposes the loss on a
different government, the United States.
In principle, several existing methods impose liability on the local
actor within a vicarious liability scheme. The first method is that the
national governments may be able to impose the loss or liability on
the subnational government. In the United States, however, no rule
allows the federal government to recoup financial liability it incurs as
a result of state or local government action, nor can it pass along the
costs of defending the claim to the local government.200 The same is
true in Canada.201 However, after Canada settled the AbitibiBowater
NAFTA case for $130 million, in which Newfoundland and Labrador
expropriated an American company’s water and timber rights,
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated,

197. Id. (“[T]he executive branch has generally adopted a deferential posture towards
the states’ VCCR enforcement efforts, limiting itself to educating state and local officials
as to what the VCCR entails and to encouraging the states to comply with its
mandates . . . .”).
198. See U.S.—Aircraft, supra note 24, ¶ 1352.
199. See id. ¶¶ 4–6 (outlining the EU’s arguments regarding the existence and effect of
U.S. federal and state-level subsidies).
200. See David I. Spector, Note, Trade Treaty Threats and Sub-National Sovereignty:
Multilateral Trade Treaties and Their Negligible Impact on State Laws, 27 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 367, 385–86, 395–96 (2004).
201. Lawrence L. Herman, Federalism and International Investment Disputes, INV.
TREATY NEWS (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/federalism-andinternational-investment-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/5V6A-VSSC].
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[While] I do not intend to get back the monies expended in this
case from the government of Newfoundland and
Labrador[,] . . . I have indicated that in future, should provincial
actions cause significant legal obligations for the government of
Canada, the government of Canada will create a mechanism so
that it can reclaim monies lost through international trade
processes.202
The European Commission’s proposal regarding the administration
of EU investment law envisions a similar mechanism.203 Although the
EU would have exclusive competence for investment law and
investment disputes, member states could be responsible for defense
costs and any resulting liability if the claim arose from their actions.204
Second, in some situations, a claimant may be able to impose
some of the loss directly on the subnational government even if it
cannot sue the subnational government directly. For example, under
WTO rules on retaliation, a party that is authorized to withdraw
concessions in response to an ongoing violation has a great deal of
discretion as to which concessions it withdraws.205 Consequently, a
savvy foreign government can craft a package of concessions to
withdraw that will principally hurt the relevant local government.
Returning to the Boeing example, the EU won a judgment declaring
that a package of subsidies for Boeing, including state and local
subsidies in Washington, Kansas, and Illinois, violated WTO rules.206
In 2012, the EU requested authorization to suspend concessions
worth approximately $12 billion annually in response to an alleged
failure by the United States to remove the unlawful subsidies.207
Although the EU has not yet named the goods on which it might
suspend concessions, it might consider withdrawing concessions on,
for example, computer or technology products in order to hurt
companies such as Microsoft and Amazon that are located in
Washington. Such sanctions might be more effective at inducing local
government compliance than would countermeasures targeting the
United States generally.
Third, national governments can engage with local governments
to induce them to change their unlawful measures, even if they cannot

202. Marotte & Ibbitson, supra note 77.
203. See Comprehensive European Investment Policy, supra note 168, at 10.
204. Id.
205. See DSU, supra note 189, art. 22.3.
206. U.S.—Aircraft, supra note 24, ¶¶ 479, 1350.
207. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), at 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/17 (Oct. 2, 2012).
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compel them to do so directly. In Canada-Renewable Energy,208 the
WTO DSB found that Ontario’s local content requirements in its
renewable energy feed-in tariff unlawfully discriminated against
foreign products.209 The Canadian government prevailed upon the
Ontario government to remove most of its local preferences, but
Canada was forced to confess to the WTO that it had failed to get
Ontario to remove all of them.210 In other cases, governments may be
able to more directly influence or even preempt local action.
Finally, vicarious liability can also incentivize governments to
nationalize actions with international effects in order to avoid
liability. The federal government might, for example, preempt the
local law, as the United States has the authority to do when U.S. state
laws conflict with WTO rules.211 Preemption has significant
limitations, however. In federal systems, national governments may
lack the ability to direct subnational governments to change their
behavior. For example, if the federal government is one of limited
and enumerated powers, as the United States government is, the
federal government may not be able to direct subordinate
governments to act on matters outside of those enumerated areas.
The “federalism” reservations that have been attached to the UN
Convention Against Corruption or the heretofore unsuccessful efforts
to ratify the UN Disabilities Convention is predicated on the view
that the U.S. federal government’s supervisory powers are indeed
limited.212

208. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector, ¶ 6, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013);
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, ¶ 6,
WTO Doc. WT/DS4426/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013).
209. Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, supra note 208, ¶ 6.
210. See Communication from Canada, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the
Renewable Energy Generation Sector, ¶ 6, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/19 (June 6, 2014)
(informing the DSB that, despite termination of proposed amendments to the FIT
program, Ontario still complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB); Status
Report by Canada, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector, at 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/17 (Feb. 14, 2014) (reporting that Ontario
tabled legislation to remove domestic content requirements from the feed-in tariff
program).
211. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(2) (2012); see also Been
& Beauvais, supra note 186, at 135–36 (noting that the federal government could preempt
local land use regulations that violate NAFTA).
212. See S. REP. NO. 109-4, § 2(1), at 6–7 (2005) (“The United States of America
reserves the right to assume obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with
its fundamental principles of federalism . . . .”); see also Thomas D. Grant, The U.N.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD): Some Observations on U.S.
Participation, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 171, 232 (2015).
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Even when nations have the legal power to regulate their states
or provinces, the political costs in countries with a strong tradition of
federalism may prohibit such regulation. Several examples illustrate
the point. In the United States, federal preemption of state laws that
are concededly unlawful under international law is highly
controversial. Following the Avena judgment, legislation requiring
state-level compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations could not get through Congress.213 Similarly, the federal
government has not taken action to preempt state subsidies for
Boeing even though such subsidies have created international
responsibility under the WTO agreements.214 Indeed, foreign nations
insist that Quebec participate directly in negotiations, knowing that
Canada itself often cannot compel Quebec’s compliance.215 In the
negotiations between the EU and Canada on the CETA, for example,
Quebec participated through its own delegation that it maintains in
Brussels and the appointment of its own chief negotiator.216 More
prosaically, national governments are not staffed to review all
legislation or administrative regulations coming from local
governments. National governments, even in developed countries,
may therefore have limited capacity to prospectively avoid liability
through preemption.
These possible methods of influence mean that vicarious liability
does create some incentives to avoid local violations of international
law. These incentives will vary by country. In countries in which
national governments have more influence over local policy, these
techniques may be relatively more effective. In systems with strong
local government, on the other hand, the incentives for local
governments to worry about violating international law will be fairly
minor.
Immunity completely fails to incentivize governments to consider
the social costs of their actions. If neither the local nor the national
government faces potential liability for an action, then the selfinterested reasons to avoid violations of international law are
minimal. National governments have reputational considerations that
may push them to comply with international law for self-interested

213. Steve Charnovitz, Editorial Comment, Correcting America’s Continuing Failure to
Comply with the Avena Judgment, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 572, 576–77 (2012).
214. Impact of Illegal European Subsidies on the U.S. Aerospace Industry, BOEING,
http://www.boeing.com/company/key-orgs/government-operations/wto.page [https://perma.cc
/658E-NSDB].
215. Johnson et al., supra note 181, at 561, 566.
216. Id.

95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017)

2017]

LOCAL LIABILITY IN INT’L ECON. LAW

301

reasons, even in the absence of liability.217 Local governments,
however, likely do not have reputations for compliance with
international law that matter to them, making the complete absence
of liability even more troubling from a compliance perspective.218
In the immunity context, therefore, the relevant actor does not
even have the weak incentives it has in the vicarious liability context
to consider the social costs of its actions. To give but one example, the
TPP’s immunity rule does not provide either the United States or
California, which on its own would be the sixth largest national
economy in the world,219 with an incentive to ensure that their existing
environmental regulations are nondiscriminatory.220 Instead of
providing an incentive to take precaution, immunity rules operate, in
a sense, as a subsidy for government action. Rather than having to
pay liability out of the public fisc, the loss borne by government actors
is absorbed directly by the victims. In effect, immunity rules create a
concentrated loss for the victim rather than a distributed loss among
the polity.
2. The Likelihood of Claims
While direct liability may cause a violator to internalize the
consequences of its action, the respondent must first be held in
violation. Such a holding, in turn, requires that claimants be willing to
bring claims. Of the three liability rules, immunity of course creates
the lowest probability of claims—zero. Direct liability and vicarious
liability create similar claims in investment law, although vicarious
liability will produce more claims in trade law. This difference, as
explained below, results from the different structure of dispute
resolution in trade and investment.
Direct liability is intuitively appealing because it places the
burden most squarely on the party actually in breach. However,
international disputes are expensive to litigate. A claim must be
sufficiently valuable before it becomes worthwhile for a challenger to
217. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 33–42, 77–111 (2008) (setting forth a reputational theory of compliance
with international law).
218. Governments might comply with international law for reasons other than selfinterest, of course. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3–9
(1995) (espousing a theory under which states have a predisposition to comply with
international law).
219. Compare 2015 State GDP, supra note 117, with 2014 World GDP, supra note 117,
at 1.
220. See TPP, supra note 10, arts. 9.12, 10.7.
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bring a claim. Any individual local government might face such a low
threat of litigation that direct liability would provide it relatively little
incentive to improve its efforts to comply with international norms.
The U.S. State of Maine or the Australian province of Western
Australia, both of which contain only small percentages of their
nation’s populations, might not present significant enough targets to
justify a claim. They therefore might escape review under a direct
liability scheme. With this in mind, the case for direct liability is less
obvious.
Consider, for example, renewable energy subsidies that require
the energy producer to purchase its equipment locally. International
tribunals have held these local content requirements to violate trade
and investment rules.221 Moreover, India has identified a number of
these programs in U.S. cities such as Austin, Texas, and Los Angeles,
California.222 But the effect of Austin’s discrimination is seemingly
not large enough to justify the political, diplomatic, and financial costs
of bring a WTO claim against the United States. India has therefore
complained about the local programs in the United States,223 but to
date has foregone a formal complaint within the WTO’s dispute
settlement system.
By contrast, vicarious liability may make challenging local
programs more viable. Vicarious liability acts as a kind of class-action
vehicle in which a series of local claims can be brought as a single
claim against the national government. Claimants can thus take
advantage of economies of scale under vicarious liability that are lost
under direct liability. Because of this, vicarious liability might lead to
more litigation than direct liability, even if the litigation that does
occur is less effective at inducing change than hypothetical litigation
against a local government. In United States-Gambling, for example,
Antigua and Barbuda challenged a set of U.S. federal measures that
restricted the provision of remote (i.e., online) cross-border gambling
services.224 Along with the federal measures, Antigua and Barbuda
challenged state measures in all fifty of the U.S. states.225 Antigua
221. See Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 23, ¶ 5.85 (holding that Ontario’s
feed-in tariff violates the national treatment obligation under the Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures).
222. Questions by India to the United States, Certain Local Content Requirements in
Some of the Renewable Energy Sector Programs, ¶¶ 2–6, WTO Doc. G/TRIMS/W/117
(Apr. 17, 2013).
223. Id.
224. Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, supra note 88, Annexes I &
II.
225. Id.
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would likely not have challenged all these state programs had it been
forced to do so individually. Similarly, a claimant may challenge a
local measure to establish the unlawfulness of a particular kind of
regulatory action practiced throughout a country. Under vicarious
liability, establishing a precedent based on a local program can have
liberalizing effects throughout the country by forcing the country to
review similar programs.
In investment law, these concerns about scale are not likely to
depress the number of claims significantly. Investment agreements
such as chapter 9 of the TPP or chapter 11 of NAFTA allow private
investors to bring claims.226 The viability of investment claims is
subject to a different calculus than trade claims, which must be
brought by a government. A private investor should be willing to
bring any claim that has positive economic value. Investors have thus
challenged even relatively small-scale programs, such as the
regulation of funeral homes in Mississippi227 or efforts to build a new,
publicly owned bridge between Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor,
Ontario.228
On the other hand, these considerations about economies of
scale would likely result in fewer trade claims under direct liability. In
trade cases, remedies do not take the form of monetary damages that
can fund litigation efforts.229 Whereas a private citizen could monetize
the possibility of a cash award to pay the costs of litigation (such as
through a contingency fee arrangement), governments cannot.
Governments may therefore face capacity constraints that prevent
them from even bringing cases with positive economic value, forcing
them to focus on claims with higher expected payoffs.230 Moreover, a

226. TPP, supra note 10, art. 9.10 (“This Article does not preclude enforcement of any
commitment, undertaking or requirement between private parties.”); NAFTA, supra note
59, arts. 1116–17 (allowing a private investor to prosecute a case against NAFTA).
227. See Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award,
¶ 3 (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005).
228. See Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2012-25, Award on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 14 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw4255.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8LH-NZUX].
229. See Robert Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A
Developing Country Perspective, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A
HANDBOOK 81, 84 (Bernard Hoekman ed., 2002) (proposing payment of monetary
damages to developing countries as a means of improving trade case remedies).
230. See Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity
Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J.
LEGAL STUD. 557, 591 (2005) (finding that capacity constraints cause states to choose
larger defendants due to the greater beneficial consequences of liberalizing larger
markets).

95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017)

304

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

state may decline to bring a good trade case for diplomatic or political
reasons that would not affect a private investor’s decision.
Even within trade law, though, one would expect these effects to
be moderated by the trade repercussions of local violations. On the
one hand, measures in particularly large subnational governments
that create large trade effects seem just as likely to be targeted under
direct liability as under vicarious liability. Regional governments like
California, New York, or Ontario would therefore face a similar risk
of claims under either direct or vicarious liability. At the other end of
the spectrum, under either regime many small, local violations will go
unchallenged, as they do under the current vicarious liability regime.
Under any liability rule, small programs that create only small
discriminatory effects may not be worth challenging. These measures
are thus unaffected by the choice of a liability rule. Again, India and
China have both identified a series of state- and city-level renewable
energy support measures in the United States that they believe
violate WTO rules.231 Yet neither has formally pushed for the
establishment of a WTO panel to consider these measures, possibly
because none of the measures are sufficiently restrictive, given their
small geographic scope.
B.

The Availability of Relief

Liability rules can also be assessed based on the extent to which
they provide relief to a successful claimant. Dispute resolution is,
after all, not only about providing prospective incentives for
respondents to regulate their conduct. It also should provide
compensation to victims of breaches that have occurred.
Here, vicarious liability has an edge over direct liability, while
immunity once again performs the worst among all three rules.
Immunity, of course, fails to offer any relief to a claimant. Thus, a
claimant’s ability to get relief depends on what level of government
behaved in a discriminatory fashion. If a local government is the
culprit, relief also depends on whether the discriminatory act in
question can be related to a discriminatory act that existed at the time
the economic treaty came into force. If those two conditions are met,
immunity affords claimants no relief.
Vicarious liability may provide better relief than direct liability in
at least two ways. First, in investment arbitrations in which the
remedies are monetary awards, national governments may have
deeper pockets than local governments. Indeed, local governments
231. See Meyer, supra note 40, at 1940.
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may be judgment proof in the same way that individual defendants in
civil suits may be.232 Moreover, enforcing an award against a national
government will be easier, all else equal, because enforcing an
arbitration award that a government (or its courts) refuses to honor
requires attaching assets in a foreign country pursuant to a treaty
regime such as the New York Convention.233 For example, successful
foreign investors have sought to attach Argentinian government
assets abroad to satisfy their awards.234 Local governments, though,
are less likely to have assets located outside of their own borders. As
a result, enforcement of monetary awards against a local government
may be more difficult if courts in the local government’s jurisdiction
refuse enforcement. Direct liability may increase the likelihood that a
defendant can avoid paying an award, leaving the successful claimant
with only a hollow victory.
The fact that direct liability tends to be joint and several under
international law does somewhat reduce the risk of hollow victories.
National governments remain responsible for local governments.
Thus, if a local government cannot satisfy an award against it, the
national government remains on the hook. In at least some
circumstances, however, jurisdiction may not exist over the national
government. For example, in Cable Television,235 the Nevis Island
Administration—a local subdivision of the St. Kitts national
government—agreed to arbitrate disputes with Cable Television.236
An investment tribunal found, however, that the St. Kitts national
government had not consented to claims against the local
232. In the domestic context, part of the rationale for vicarious liability is that a
hierarchically superior entity may have deeper pockets than the perpetrator of an offense.
A company, for example, will typically have more money than an employee, who might be
judgment proof. In constitutional tort litigation in the United States, suits formally
proceed against individual officers, but in fact governments routinely indemnify such
officers, again shifting liability to the government. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (finding that officers are “virtually
always indemnified” in police misconduct cases); Gregory C. Sisk, Official Wrongdoing
and the Civil Liability of the Federal Government and Officers, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296,
319 (2011) (noting that individual government employees are likely to fear substantial
personal responsibility despite the fact that most are indemnified).
233. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
art. 3, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (stating that each party to the
convention “shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance
with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon”) .
234. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2252 (2014)
(holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not protect a debtor nation from
discovery requests during a proceeding to enforce an arbitration award).
235. Cable Television of Nevis Ltd. v. Fed’n of St. Kitts & Nevis, ICSID Case No.
ARB/95/2, Award (Jan. 13, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 106 (2002).
236. Id. ¶¶ 2.21–.22.
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government; in other words, St. Kitts had not consented to direct
liability for its localities.237 Moreover, St. Kitts itself had not agreed to
arbitrate disputes with Cable Television.238 Thus, while St. Kitts would
have been responsible for the local government’s violation,
jurisdiction prevented effective liability.239 In similar situations, the
risk of an unenforceable award is real.
Second, in trade disputes, foreign governments may have an
easier time retaliating in a way that hurts national governments.240
Under WTO law, if a government does not bring itself into
compliance with a recommendation of the DSB the successful
complainant can get permission to suspend concessions.241 It can, for
example, raise tariffs above the level permitted by its WTO
commitments. As discussed above, governments have wide discretion
in choosing which concessions to suspend.242 They will choose which
concessions to withdraw with an eye toward increasing the political
pressure on the violating government to bring itself into compliance.
For example, in 2002, President Bush imposed safeguards on steel
imports that were designed to curry favor with voters in Midwestern
states that feared the loss of manufacturing jobs.243 The WTO DSB
found the safeguards unlawful.244 After President Bush indicated he
intended to leave the safeguards in place notwithstanding the DSB’s
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Remedies in trade are principally regulatory, rather than compensatory, while
remedies in investment are both. The Dispute Settlement Understanding makes clear that
the purpose of suspending concessions is to induce the breaching party to bring itself into
compliance. DSU, supra note 189, art. 22. Moreover, suspending concessions is harmful to
both countries, as it limits the availability of cheap products or services in the claimant’s
own country, making it an odd form of compensation.
241. Id. (“If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent
with a covered agreement into compliance[,] . . . any party having invoked the dispute
settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application
to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements.”).
242. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones)—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Union Under
Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 81, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) (“[T]he U.S. is
free to pick products from the proposed [suspension] list as long as the total trade value is
lower than or equivalent to the amount of nullification and impairment we have
found . . . .”).
243. See David E. Sanger, Bush Puts Tariffs of as Much as 30% on Steel Imports, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/06/us/bush-puts-tariffs-of-as-muchas-30-on-steel-imports.html?pagewanted=all.
244. Mark Tran, Bush Lifts Steel Tariffs to Avert Trade War, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4,
2003), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/04/usa.wto1 [https://perma.cc/T4ELBM3P].
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judgment, the EU threatened to impose tariffs on Florida oranges and
Michigan automobiles, among other products.245 The EU chose these
specific products to hurt the Bush administration and the Republican
Party in key electoral states.246 Its calculus was successful, as President
Bush lifted the safeguards shortly thereafter.247
Such mechanisms might not work as well against local
governments, however. Local jurisdictions may have smaller or less
diversified economies. In principle, the effect of a smaller, less
diversified economy can cut either way. In some instances, the result
could be that local governments are more vulnerable than they might
otherwise be. If the complaining foreign government is a primary
market for the local jurisdiction’s goods, for example, the local
government may come into compliance faster than a national
government that is diversified. A locality with an economy heavily
dependent on agriculture, for example, might quickly remove a
discriminatory measure if a major market like the EU raised tariffs on
one of its staple products. The consequences of the foreign
government’s countermeasures are magnified, in effect, by the small
or undiversified nature of the local economy.
On the other hand, in many other cases the foreign government
may have no economic leverage over the local government. The
discriminating local jurisdiction might not export products (or
services) to the complaining foreign country, for example. Or even if
it does, the discriminatory measure might protect one of the major
producers in the local jurisdiction. Finally, in some instances the
complaining nation might need the violator’s exports more than the
violator needs the particular market. For example, oil-exporting
nations have never been targeted in the WTO even though many
nations claim that countries like Saudi Arabia violate WTO rules in
restricting the production and export of oil.248 In any of these
situations, identifying countermeasures that pressure the local
government into changing its behavior may be more difficult than
identifying such countermeasures for the national government. For
245. Id.
246. William Neikirk, EU Targets U.S. Goods as Retort to Steel Tariffs, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 5, 2002) (“To make a point, Europe has decided to fight politics with politics.”), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-04-05/business/0204050259_1_trade-promotion-authorityforeign-steel-products-trade-war [https://perma.cc/2DBM-STKU].
247. Tran, supra note 244.
248. For example, Representative Peter DeFazio introduced a resolution in the U.S.
House of Representatives urging President George W. Bush to “file a complaint in the
World Trade Organization against oil-producing nations for violating their obligations
under the rules of that organization.” H.R. Con. Res. 276, 106th Cong. (2000).
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both of these reasons, the availability of relief—with its associated
incentives to change one’s behavior in response to an adverse
judgment—suggests that vicarious liability may be the superior rule.
* * *
Immunity, as this discussion makes clear, does a poor job of
fulfilling the goals of a liability rule. It provides governments with no
incentive to prospectively regulate their conduct and no relief for
aggrieved claimants. Vicarious liability versus direct liability is a
closer call, but ultimately direct liability is the better rule. As
currently conceived, direct liability does a better job of providing
incentives for local governments to consider the costs of their actions
on others. It also provides an equal incentive to bring claims in
investment law, although it may lead to fewer claims in trade law.
Strict vicarious liability, however, likely provides more effective relief
to the successful claimant and may do as well at encouraging
monitoring. As explained in Part V, a system of joint and several
liability could capture the benefits of both direct and strict vicarious
liability.
III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY LEADS TO IMMUNITY
Before turning to what a more robust direct liability regime
might look like, however, this Article turns to unlocking a puzzle. If
direct liability is the best liability rule and immunity the worst, why
are states moving towards immunity? Vicarious liability is a longstanding rule embraced by all states as recently as the founding of the
WTO and NAFTA twenty years ago. Moreover, many states are
centralized, making it unclear why they would agree to immunity
rules that largely benefit federal states.
This Part shows that national governments increasingly eliminate
vicarious liability for local government action because (1) of
disparities in bargaining power among federal and non-federal
nations and (2) the structure of remedies in international economic
law—especially investment law—which pushes national governments
to emphasize their role as potential respondents over their role as
potential claimants. Section A discusses the general conditions under
which states will negotiate for immunity rather than vicarious liability,
the default rule. Sections B and C analyze how states will negotiate in
two bargaining situations: negotiations between states that are both
either centralized or decentralized, and negotiations between a
centralized state and a decentralized state. Section D concludes that
decentralized states will drive the empirical trend towards immunity
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due to the economic importance of federal countries in the world
today.
A. Immunity and Vicarious Liability from a State’s Point of View
Consider the following illustration: Under the international law
of state responsibility, vicarious liability is only a default rule.249
Under the default rule, liability for local action is reciprocal. State A
receives some positive benefits from being able to challenge local
action in State B. The ability of State B to challenge State A’s local
action is, however, costly to State A. We can thus think of a state’s
utility from the status quo under vicarious liability as
Ui

SL

= Xi – Yi

where Xi equals the ith state’s utility from being able to target local
action in another state, and Yi equals the costs created by
responsibility for one’s own local governments. X, in other words, is
the expected value one gets as a potential claimant under vicarious
liability. Y equals the expected costs one faces as a respondent under
vicarious liability.
Y can also be thought of, in part, as a function of the
centralization of a country. Decentralized countries will have high
values of Y, while centralized countries will have lower values of Y.
To see why this is so, consider that a state subject to international
economic law will take precautions to avoid liability up until the point
at which the precautions are costlier than the benefits they create.
These precautions—essentially forcing local governments to bring
their measures into conformity with international rules—create both
costs and benefits for the national government. This Article shall
refer to these precautions as “liberalizing” because they typically
involve removing barriers to trade and investment. Liberalization is
beneficial to a national government for two reasons. First, it reduces
its exposure to foreign claims. Second, it benefits domestic consumers
by giving them access to the best available prices on international
markets.
At the same time, liberalization creates two sets of costs. First,
domestic producers prefer protectionism to liberalization.250 They will
249. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 34, at 42 (“In applying this
test, of course, each case will have to be dealt with on the basis of its own facts and
circumstances.”).
250. See Carl J. Green, The New Protectionism, 3 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 11–13
(1981) (describing the United States’ efforts to achieve protectionist goals through
enforcement of unfair trade laws).
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therefore put pressure on their governments to refuse to liberalize.251
Second, overriding local governments can be costly in both legal and
political terms. For example, in a federal state such as the United
States, the federal government might pass a law automatically
preempting any local law that an international tribunal found
inconsistent with international law. Or a national government might
preempt state laws in areas that are particularly likely to raise
discrimination concerns, such as environmental and health
regulations. Such actions, however, would surely be challenged in the
courts as inconsistent with the federal constitutional structure of the
United States.252 Moreover, even if such actions are constitutional,
they are politically tenuous in a country that prides itself on strong
local government.253 In more centralized states, such as China, this
second set of costs will be lower. Such countries have fewer legal and
political barriers to national preemption of local action. Indeed, in
some centralized countries, especially small ones, all meaningful
power may be centralized in the national government.
Under vicarious liability, states will liberalize up until the point
at which the marginal costs of liberalization exceed the marginal
benefits in terms of reduced liability and political benefits from
consumers. In principle, states perform the same calculus at the
national level, liberalizing up until the point that the costs of
liberalization exceed its benefits. The difference, however, is that
liberalizing at the local level may be costlier in some states than
liberalizing at the national level. States with high costs of liberalizing
at the local level (decentralized states) will liberalize more at the
national than the local level. States with low costs to eliminating nonconforming local programs (centralized states) may not have to
distinguish their liberalization efforts based on the level of
government. Thus, high costs to liberalizing leads to a high Y, while,
all else equal, low costs to liberalizing local programs will produce a
lower Y.
Now consider immunity. Under immunity, states cannot bring
claims. Thus, their expected claims and expected liability are both
251. See id.
252. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088–90 (2014) (upholding a
federalism challenge to a federal statute implementing the Chemical Weapons
Convention).
253. JOHN SAMPLES & EMILY EKINS, CATO INST., PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
FEDERALISM: THE PUBLIC’S PREFERENCE FOR RENEWED FEDERALISM 1 (2014), https://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa759_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/96BC-98PA]
(concluding from surveys that “Americans support a more decentralized federalism than
in the past both on particular issues and as a general matter of institutional confidence”).
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zero. However, because immunity is not the default rule, states must
agree to change from vicarious liability to immunity. A state’s utility
under immunity thus depends on the costs and benefits of agreeing on
immunity. A state will only agree to change the liability rule to
immunity if the marginal benefits of immunity are greater than or
Immunity
SL
equal to the marginal costs (Ui
> Ui ). Let C equal the value of
a concession offered to shift from vicarious liability to immunity. If
accepted, a state’s utility from immunity is
Ui

Immunity

= Ci

where Ci is positive if a state accepts a concession to agree to
immunity and negative if it must offer a concession. Therefore, state i
will only offer or accept a concession in exchange for changing the
rule if
Ci ≥ Xi – Yi .
Moreover, this equation must be true for all states that must consent
to the change in liability. In other words, there must be some
concession that at least one state can make that makes it better off
than it would be under vicarious liability (because the concession is
less costly than its net expected liability under vicarious liability) and
that compensates those states that have positive expected utility
under vicarious liability.
A simple numeric example illustrates the point. Imagine that the
United States obtains utility of 5 (XUS) from being able to challenge
discriminatory local acts in South Korea but faces expected liability of
10 (YUS) from South Korea or South Korean investors challenging
local acts in the United States. Plugging these values into the equation
above, the United States would be willing to make a concession worth
up to 5 (CUS ≥ –5 because the United States is making the concession)
in order to induce South Korea to agree to immunity.
Imagine that for its part, South Korea obtains 4 (XSK) from being
able to challenge local acts in the United States and suffers only
1 (YSK) in terms of expected claims because it is a relatively
centralized state. Under strict vicarious liability, South Korea’s utility
is therefore equal to 3. South Korea, however, would be willing to
agree to immunity so long as the United States makes a concession
worth at least 3 (CSK ≥ 4 – 1). As the United States would pay up to 5
to avoid vicarious liability, the two states can agree to change the
default rule. By contrast, if XSK = 7, no agreement is possible. Then,
CSK ≥ 7 – 1. Since the United States cannot justify compensating
South Korea more than 5, vicarious liability will remain in place.
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Bargaining Among Similar States and the Unintended
Consequences of Investor-State Dispute Settlement

How realistically likely is it that states will bargain around the
default rule? Consider the four basic bargaining scenarios that may
arise. In the first situation, two centralized states negotiate an
economic agreement. This situation is fairly straightforward. The
parties here have similar incentives as both claimants and
respondents. Moreover, neither expects to incur significant liability as
a result of local action (Y approaches zero). Because local
governments in centralized states retain little independent authority,
centralized states can liberalize local measures at costs similar to
those they incur liberalizing national measures. They will therefore
see little need to change the default vicarious liability rule.
In the second situation, two decentralized nations negotiate an
agreement. Each decentralized government expects to be targeted as
a respondent based on local action (each has a high value of Y).
Significant local lawmaking powers, coupled with high costs to
overriding local governments, means that both states face high
expected liability from local action. A state’s utility from vicarious
liability depends, of course, both on its own expected liability as well
as its own expected gains from its role as a potential claimant (that is,
it depends also on the value of X). Two decentralized states thus
might reasonably agree to maintain vicarious liability so long as both
states face high expected claims. One state’s liability is another state’s
gain.254 As it turns out, however, decentralized nations are likely to
increase their use of immunity over time, especially in the investment
context,255 thus insulating a growing portion of regulation from
international review. They may also do so in the trade context where,
as in the case of trade in services, regulation is highly local and
protectionist.
To see why, consider the differing structure of dispute resolution
in investment and trade. In investment law, remedies are typically
monetary awards, but private parties, rather than national
governments, bring claims.256 As a consequence, national

254. Moreover, maintaining liability may increase overall welfare, as it leads to greater
liberalization over time. An increase in the expected liability means a state is more likely
to take costly action to liberalize local law. These gains from liberalization, though, may
not be as directly captured by the national government, for reasons discussed below.
255. See supra Section I.B.
256. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], InvestorState Dispute Settlement: Public Consultation: 16 May–9 July 2012, ¶ 11 (July 9, 2012),

95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017)

2017]

LOCAL LIABILITY IN INT’L ECON. LAW

313

governments have high expected liability under investment law
because they are the respondents faced with the prospect of financial
liability. Moreover, private parties might be expected to bring more
claims than governments because diplomacy and politics do not deter
claims. By definition, decentralized states also have little ability to
reduce their liability for local government acts. Finally, since private
parties bring claims, states are not themselves claimants in investment
law. They therefore do not capture significant value from their role as
claimants. The result is that decentralized states overwhelmingly face
negative utility from claims challenging local acts in investment law.
They pay all the costs of being a respondent, have little ability to
avoid or reduce those costs, and do not benefit reciprocally from
direct role as a claimant (X < Y).
To be sure, businesses that expected to be claimants under
investment regimes—for example, companies in the extractive
sector—provide political support for investor-state dispute resolution,
meaning that national governments do capture some political support
from their nationals’ role as claimants. But they do not capture the
gains directly, even though they experience the losses—both financial
and political—directly. X is therefore smaller than Y for both
countries under an investment regime. Consequently, moving from
vicarious liability to immunity makes both parties better off. Little is
necessary in the way of concessions from one side to the other (C can
be small or zero).
This fact exposes an unintended consequence of the investment
law regime. By privatizing claims, states created a mechanism that
weakens their long-term commitment to investor-state dispute
resolution in areas in which avoiding liability is costly ex ante. When
they are unable to take precautions to reduce liability—as
decentralized nations are unable to do in the investment context—
they will immunize themselves from liability altogether. In other
words, ISDS is politically unstable under a vicarious liability regime
because over time its structure encourages national governments to
adopt a defense counsel mentality.
The evidence of this instability is pervasive. The growing use of
immunity provisions257 provides some evidence. But increasingly loud
attacks on ISDS sound in the same tones. Politicians like Senator
Elizabeth Warren,258 and officials in Australia,259 Germany,260
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7UDQ-652L].
257. See supra Section I.B.
258. See Warren, supra note 14.

95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017)

314

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

France,261 and the European Parliament262 openly wonder what their
governments get out of allowing private parties to influence
government policies through international arbitration. The fact that
their own nationals can bring investment claims to influence policies
in other countries counts little to them. Multinational enterprises—
the kinds of companies most likely to use ISDS—do not necessarily
have policy interests aligned with their own governments.263
The situation in trade is different. There, national governments
are both claimants and respondents. The expected gains from being a
claimant are thus much more likely to equate to the expected losses
as a respondent. Governments can bring claims in order to gain
political support from domestic exporters and consumers, and they
face political costs from anti-import interests in their role as
respondents. Given the gains from long-term liberalization that
governments believe accrue from trade, it is more likely that the
utility from vicarious liability is positive for both countries (X > Y,
SL
and therefore U > 0).
Interestingly, governments appear to have settled on vicarious
liability for trade in goods but immunity for existing discriminatory
measures in trade in services.264 This fact suggests that expected gains
as a claimant exceed expected losses as a respondent in goods but not
services, despite the reciprocal nature of dispute resolution. One
possible explanation for this phenomenon is the strongly local and
often protectionist nature of laws governing the provision of services,
such as licensing rules in federal countries like the United States. As
Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw Allensworth observe, professional
licensing is done primarily at the state level in the United States.265
Moreover, professional licensing is both deeply protectionist, raising
antitrust concerns domestically, and so politically entrenched that

259. See Kyla Tienhaara & Patricia Ranald, Australia’s Rejection of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Four Potential Contributing Factors, INV. TREATY NEWS (July 12,
2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/australias-rejection-of-investor-state-dispute-settlementfour-potential-contributing-factors/ [https://perma.cc/D9VA-6WNC].
260. See Barbiere, supra note 16.
261. See id.
262. See Aline Robert, European Parliament Backs TTIP, Rejects ISDS,
EURACTIV.COM (July 9, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news
/european-parliament-backs-ttip-rejects-isds/ [https://perma.cc/XZ52-DA5T].
263. See Warren, supra note 14 (“Agreeing to ISDS in this enormous new treaty would
tilt the playing field in the United States further in favor of big multinational corporations.
Worse, it would undermine U.S. sovereignty.”).
264. See supra Section I.B.
265. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 114, at 1096.
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national regulation has proved elusive.266 Together, these factors may
mean that federal states face higher expected liability for local action
than expected gains. In the trade in goods context, by contrast, border
measures such as tariffs—which are under the control of the national
government—are relatively more important in determining the ease
with which foreigners can access markets. Liberalizing to avoid
liability thus does not tread on politically important local
protectionism to the same degree.
C.

Bargaining Among Decentralized and Centralized Nations

Two other bargaining situations involve a mix of centralized and
decentralized states. In the third situation, a powerful decentralized
state negotiates with a weaker centralized nation. In this situation, we
can again expect states to alter the default rule in favor of immunity,
all else equal. The powerful decentralized nation, such as the United
States, stands to lose under the default rule because it becomes liable
for the actions of its local governments but is not easily able to avoid
that liability by liberalizing local acts (Y is high). At the same time,
the other nation is centralized, meaning that local powers are weak
and easily overridden by the center should it wish to avoid
international liability. Therefore, the decentralized nation receives
little from vicarious liability (X is low).
The reverse is true for the centralized nation, which has high
expected value as a claimant and low expected liability. In other
words, the vicarious liability rule favors the centralized state. In this
situation, a concession will be necessary to induce the weak state to
agree to immunity. The question is thus whether there is a concession
that makes both states better off. Will the decentralized state be able
to offer something that costs less than its expected liability but
compensates the centralized state for its foregone liability?
The structure of remedies in trade and investment law once again
makes this result more likely. From the standpoint of the two
governments involved, liability in any given case is likely negativesum,267 meaning the state that loses the case (likely the decentralized
state) loses more than the state on the prevailing side. As explained
above, this result occurs in investment cases because the claimant is
not actually the state in question. One state thus loses and the other
state receives only diffuse political benefits from having established
266. Id.
267. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.
579, 605 (2005).
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the system that allows its investors to bring claims. In trade cases, this
result is less obvious because states are on both sides. However,
because remedies in trade are only prospective, they do not make the
complaining party whole.268 They are thus costly to the respondent
and fail to completely compensate the complainant. For this reason,
states may eliminate jurisdiction ex ante over those trade claims that
are especially difficult for the complainant to comply with. Doing so
creates a net gain for the parties by eliminating the unavoidable losses
that come from local programs that decentralized states cannot easily
liberalize.
The fact that removing liability for local acts creates gains for the
parties combined does not tell us what the parties will trade to agree
on immunity. After all, the centralized state loses from immunity
while the decentralized state wins. The decentralized state must
therefore offer some of its gains to the centralized state.
Game theory predicts here that the parties will agree to a
relatively small concession in exchange for immunity for local
claims.269 The intuition behind this prediction flows from the notion of
opportunity costs. To take a concrete example, consider negotiations
between the United States and Uruguay on a BIT. The opportunity
cost of failing to reach an agreement in February differs greatly for
the two states. For the United States, Uruguay is just one relatively
small market among many. If the two countries cannot agree until
June or February of the following year, the United States has lost
little. For Uruguay, the stakes are higher. The United States has the
fourth largest stock of foreign investment in Uruguay.270 Failure to
reach agreement thus risks costing Uruguay a significant portion of its
foreign investment. In bargaining, the United States is thus able to
wait out Uruguay, using the greater benefit to Uruguay as part of the
concession to induce Uruguay to agree to immunity.271 In a
268. Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade
Law Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102, 110 (2011) (“[T]he WTO rules are widely
understood by scholars and WTO arbitration panels to permit only prospective
remedies . . . .”).
269. Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1120–33 (1999) (using game theory concepts to explain
cooperation and decision-making by and between nations).
270. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, URUGUAY: INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015, at 3
(2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241998.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N7ZNFHL].
271. One could formalize this result using a basic Rubinstein bargaining model. In such
a model, parties make sequential offers to divide a pie. In each round, the offeree can
accept the offeror’s proposed division of the pie and realize its payoff, or it can reject the
offer and proceed to the next round where it gets to make an offer. Success in the next
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multilateral context, such as the TPP negotiations, the invitation to
participate in the negotiations at all might be part of the concession.
Countries can, after all, join the TPP after it is complete, provided
that current members agree.272 When doing so, they have little ability
to alter its rules, a situation in which South Korea now finds itself.273
In other words, by controlling the terms of participation, a
country like the United States can avoid having to make significant
concessions on the substantive rules contained in the agreement. The
powerful state has the ability to effectively exclude the less powerful
state from a trade agreement, either through delay or outright
exclusion. The weaker state’s choice, in effect, is no agreement today
or agreement today with immunity for local provisions. If market
access is important to the weaker state, it will prefer to agree today,
even on terms that it finds suboptimal.
The fourth situation involves a powerful centralized state and a
weaker decentralized state. The analysis of winners and losers is the
same as in the third situation: a move to immunity favors the
decentralized state, while retaining vicarious liability favors the
centralized state. Here, though, the power disparities suggest that the
centralized state will be difficult to move off of its preferred rule. Of
course, international negotiations are complicated. Powerful states
may be willing to give up their preferred liability rule if sufficient
offsetting concessions are put on the table. But the logic of
opportunity costs discussed above cuts the other way in these
situations. Now the weaker decentralized state is pressured to agree
to future liability for local measures (i.e., retaining vicarious liability)
in order to induce agreement. Consequently, it is expected that
vicarious liability would remain in more situations. The weaker state
simply cannot come up with a big enough concession to compensate
the more powerful state.
Chinese economic treaties provide the clearest example of this
dynamic. As discussed in Section I.B, China includes a provision in its
agreements exempting all of its existing non-conforming measures,
not only local ones.274 It includes such a provision even in agreements

round, however, is less valuable than success in the current round because parties discount
the future. Knowing this, rational parties will agree in the first round but take into account
their respective discount rates. A state with a higher discount rate receives a smaller share
of the gains. In effect, the concession the more patient state must make to get an
agreement shrinks as the opportunity cost of failing to agree rises for the other state.
272. TPP, supra note 10, art. 30.4 (describing the procedures for accession to the TPP).
273. See Jun, supra note 3.
274. See supra Section I.B.
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with federal states such as Australia that only request exemption for
their regional and local measures.275 Access to the Chinese market on
preferential terms is valuable to states such as Australia and Canada,
and certainly to smaller economies with whom China enters into
agreements. China is thus able to extract much broader immunity as
the price of any local immunity in federal states.
D. Empirical Trends
These bargaining dynamics suggest that, in theory, we should see
immunity in some situations but vicarious liability in others.
Empirically, however, good reasons exist to think that immunity will
continue to replace vicarious liability if another approach is not
identified. First, many of the most important economies in the world
are federal: Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, India,
Mexico, Russia, and the United States, to name only a handful. If just
these countries began uniformly immunizing existing local measures
from discrimination challenges in their future agreements, a wide
range of regulatory activity will escape international review.
Second, the number and importance of these countries to the
global economy suggests that powerful decentralized states
negotiating with weaker centralized states—a situation that produces
immunity—will occur more frequently than the reverse situation. For
the same reason, negotiations among federal countries also capture a
much greater share of the global economy than negotiations among
centralized countries. NAFTA, for example, is an agreement entirely
among federal countries, and four of the five largest economies in the
TPP are federal countries (Australia, Canada, Mexico, and the
United States).276
Finally, China is perhaps the largest centralized economy that
could push back against immunity. Instead, however, it appears that
China is willing to accept local immunity in exchange for
comprehensive immunity for its own existing discriminatory
measures.277 Far from pushing back on immunity, China is expanding
the trend.278 This bargaining dynamic suggests a significant limitation
on the liberalizing effects of potential future trade agreements
between China and the United States or the EU. Permanently

275.
276.
277.
278.

See supra Section I.B and text accompanying note 135.
See 2014 World GDP, supra note 117.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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grandfathering existing discriminatory programs in China is a high
price to pay for protecting local governments.
More generally, observers should be greatly concerned that the
immunity provisions in current economic treaties will expand. At
present, they apply only to existing discriminatory measures and any
renewal, amendment, or modification thereof. The prominence of
federal economies in the world, combined with China’s position on
grandfathering, suggests that broader immunity provisions could
easily be the way of the future. Such provisions might, for example,
immunize all local measures, existing or future. The immunity
provisions might also expand beyond the nondiscrimination rules,
providing protection for challenges based on investment law on fair
and equitable treatment, for example. The TPP’s provision granting
immunity from any claims challenging tobacco control measures
suggests that the possibility of broader immunity is not far-fetched.279
IV. IMMUNITY’S THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Governments and policymakers thus find themselves in a
difficult position. Vicarious liability and direct liability each have
benefits, but governments increasingly replace vicarious liability with
immunity. Moreover, this trend is accelerating and could threaten to
undermine the liberalizing effects of international economic
agreements. Dani Rodrik, a highly regarded Harvard trade
economist, has noted that economic models showing that the TPP will
increase real incomes in member states depend on assumptions that
may be unrealistic.280 The gains from the TPP depend on reducing
non-tariff barriers and loosening restrictions on foreign investment,
including by eliminating discrimination.281 The findings of this Article
further underscore Rodrik’s concerns. By insulating large swaths of
discrimination from challenge, the TPP and agreements like it reduce
the economic benefits of the agreement. Yet economic predictions
fail to catch this significant limitation.
This Part provides the missing piece of the analysis, arguing that
immunity has dire consequences for international economic law for
three reasons. First, immunity reduces the general welfare of the
populations in both countries. Second, it has distributional effects that
threaten the legitimacy of the international economic system.
279. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
280. See Rodrik, supra note 9 (noting that assuming “labor markets are sufficiently
flexible” to offset job losses in adversely affected parts of the economy by job gains
elsewhere is an “inexplicable” conclusion).
281. Id.
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Specifically, immunity further skews the gains from international
economic law toward large economies that tend to be relatively
decentralized. Third, immunity for local action insulates localities
right at the time that local governments are playing an increasingly
important role in international governance.
A. Welfare Effects of Local Immunity
In general, local immunity reduces the economic gains both
countries might otherwise expect from an agreement such as the TPP.
Given the strong debate among economists about the overall effect of
the TPP on welfare,282 this finding is significant.
The basic theory underlying trade liberalization explains these
foregone gains. Discriminating against foreign products or services
raises the cost of those foreign products or services in the domestic
market. For example, if foreign service providers must pay additional
costs to become licensed to provide a service in the United States,
they will have to charge more for their services, or may not be able to
provide them at all. Domestic consumers thus lose out because they
pay prices for goods that are inflated by the government’s
discrimination. Foreign producers lose out because they lose market
share. On the other hand, domestic producers that sell in the domestic
market gain market share because they do not have to compete on
price. These domestic producers, in turn, confer political benefits on
the government that protects them. These benefits, though, normally
do not exceed the costs absorbed by foreign producers and domestic
consumers.283 Protectionism thus creates both winners and losers, but
overall reduces welfare.284
An example illustrates the point. The Canadian province of
Ontario put in place a feed-in tariff (“FIT”) scheme that paid
electricity producers preferential rates for energy generated
renewably so long as the renewable generation equipment was locally
produced.285 An American corporation, Mesa Energy, challenged this
so-called “local content requirement” as discriminating against

282. Compare Petri & Plummer, supra note 7, at 1–3 (predicting that the TPP will
increase annual U.S. GDP by .5%), with Capaldo & Izurieta, supra note 6, at 1 (predicting
negative effects on growth in the United States and Japan).
283. ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
18–20 (2d ed. Supp. 2012).
284. Id.
285. Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 12, 19–22, PCA
Case No. 2012-17 (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw1203.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW4C-7JTT].
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foreign investors in violation of NAFTA.286 In essence, Mesa claimed
(as the United States, the EU, and Japan successfully did within the
WTO)287 that it lost sales of its renewable energy equipment within
Ontario because Ontario electricity producers were able to purchase
locally produced equipment more cheaply as a result of the Ontario
subsidy.288 Without the subsidy, the locally produced equipment might
have been more expensive than Mesa’s turbines. Thus, Mesa Energy
lost market share within Ontario, while Ontario citizens shouldered
the fiscal burden of providing a subsidy to local renewable energy
equipment producers.
By immunizing local governments from the pressure to liberalize
their discriminatory practices, agreements like the TPP thus reduce
the overall welfare gains from economic agreements. Under the TPP,
a program like Ontario’s FIT program could not be challenged by
private parties. While American producers could proceed, as Mesa
did, under NAFTA, TPP members such as Japan without another
investment agreement with Canada would be out of luck. Such
producers would continue to lose market share while Canadian
consumers of renewable energy equipment would not obtain the most
competitive product.
This conclusion needs to be qualified in two respects. On the one
hand, economic discrimination against foreign economic interests is
more likely at the local level of government than the national level.289
Insulating local government from discrimination claims thus may
protect great swaths of economic discrimination, making immunity
even worse than it might otherwise seem. On the other hand, local
discrimination also can promote local efforts to provide global public
goods, such as climate mitigation efforts.290 While economic law’s
nondiscrimination rules cause local governments to internalize the
costs of their actions in foreign jurisdictions, the same rules provide
no means for those governments to capture any benefits their
measures create.291
One approach to solving this problem is a complete carve-out in
economic agreements for particular areas where possibly
discriminatory actions might increase the general welfare. The TPP

286. Id. ¶ 73.
287. See Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 23, ¶ 5.85.
288. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 285, ¶¶ 28–31.
289. Meyer, supra note 40, at 1942 (“[D]iscriminatory conditions are more likely at
smaller scales of government.”).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1940.
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includes such a carve-out, for example, for tobacco control measures,
which can be completely insulated from challenge.292 Professor Gus
Van Harten has similarly argued that regional trade and investment
agreements should include a carve-out for climate measures.293 Both
of these approaches, as well as the approach of simply immunizing
local conduct, are too broad. They protect too much discriminatory
regulation, thereby eliminating many of the gains from economic
treaties.
Instead, changes should be made to the doctrines used to
evaluate the legality of discrimination. In the context of local
discrimination, this means that liability should exist for local acts, but
such local acts should be evaluated in light of the specific features of
local lawmaking.294 Put differently, local discrimination can have
offsetting benefits and those benefits are worth protecting. But the
best way to protect those benefits is not by an overly broad immunity
for local governments. It is through a more targeted evaluation of
which local programs promote the general welfare by creating
positive spillovers and non-economic benefits and which, consistent
with standard trade theory, simply create welfare losses for foreign
suppliers and domestic consumers.
B.

Distributional Effects and the Legitimacy of International
Economic Law

Immunity for local measures also creates distributional effects
that favor large countries with federal systems. Should the trend
toward local immunity accelerate, these effects could call into
question the legitimacy of international economic law. Sensitivity to
these concerns is especially important at a time when trade and
investment agreements such as the TPP, the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, and CETA are under attack.295
The distributional effects of local immunity are clearest if one
considers bargaining between large federal states like the United
States and weaker centralized states. As discussed above, these
situations are empirically more common and cover a greater
percentage of world trade than the reverse—a negotiation between a
292. TPP, supra note 10, art. 29.5.
293. Gus Van Harten, An ISDS Carve-Out to Support Action on Climate Change, in 11
OSGOODE HALL L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, no. 38, Mar. 2016, at 4, http://
canadians.org/sites/default/files/publications/VanHarten-EN-Mar2016.pdf [https://perma.cc
/VQ8Z-QLVG].
294. Meyer, supra note 40, at 1992.
295. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14.
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large centralized economy and a decentralized smaller economy.296
For example, TPP negotiations, as well as many bilateral negotiations
between Central and South American countries and the United
States, fall into this category. As explained, these smaller economies
will not agree to immunity unless they are given concessions at least
equal to what they stand to lose from the move to immunity.297 In an
absolute sense, these states are not made any worse off by immunity
rules.
In a relative sense, however, they are made worse off. States will
only agree to immunity if the move makes them better off relative to
their alternative. The concessions from federal states to non-federal
states ensure that this condition is satisfied. In economic terms, it
ensures that immunity is Pareto superior to the alternative. But it says
nothing about how, or by whom, that alternative is defined. Because
powerful states can link agreement on immunity to the broader
market access concessions contained in the agreement, these powerful
states will capture a greater share of the surplus from cooperation.
For example, by delaying agreement, large federal economies like the
EU or the United States could induce agreement on immunity
without offering significantly greater concessions in terms of the
substance of the agreement. They therefore get the benefit of their
preferred rule—immunity—without having to significantly alter the
terms of the agreement in their trading partners’ favor.
As a result, the terms of economic treaties satisfy the relatively
weak Pareto efficiency condition, but they skew the gains towards
developed federal countries. These distributional effects cost not only
those states that get less in terms of gains from cooperation; they also
can cost large economies in the long run. These distributional effects
create the perception that the deck is stacked against developing
countries. Fearing that international economic law is simply a
replacement for the colonial system that ended after World War II,
these states may increasingly reject the international economic law
system entirely.
In the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, several South
American countries did just that. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all
withdrew from the ICSID Convention, removing that institution’s
jurisdiction over future investor-state claims.298 These countries also
296. See supra Section I.B.
297. See supra Section I.B.
298. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. (UNCTAD), Denunciation of the ICSID
Convention and BITS: Impact on Investor-State Claims, IIA Issues Note, no. 2, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/6, at 1 (Dec. 2010), http://unctad.org/en/Docs
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began denouncing some of their BITs.299 Other Latin American
countries, including Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico, among others, have
declined to join the ICSID Convention in the first place.300 Argentina
has threatened to withdraw from ICSID in the wake of a large
number of successful investment claims against it following its
financial collapse,301 but has not yet done so.302
Although currently confined to Latin America, these trends
illustrate the risks of an international economic system that is
perceived to favor wealthy nations. Distributional considerations can
strain the system’s existence, a threat that impacts the interests of
both developed and developing states. For this reason, removing an
unnecessary carve-out for local measures that favors developed
federal states would, in the long run, help preserve the international
economic system.
C.

Insulating the Future from International Governance

The final difficulty with immunity is that it removes international
accountability for local governments at the same time that local
governments are increasingly exercising their authority in a way that
produces international effects. The reasons for the importance of
local governments are multifaceted. Economic interdependence has
given many traditionally local powers an international dimension.
Economic integration means that local laws can have significant
effects on foreign investors or producers. The global nature of many
businesses highlights this point. Multinational enterprises often own
businesses and property in many different countries, meaning that
they are potentially subject to the jurisdiction of many different
national and local governments. Local regulation of these enterprises
thus has a global dimension simply because of the nature of the

/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y267-2XAF] (Bolivia and Ecuador withdrawal);
Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s Withdrawal from ICSID: What It Does and Does Not
Achieve, INV. TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13
/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/
[https://perma.cc
/SZ3J-XJGH] (Venezuela withdrawal).
299. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. (UNCTAD), supra note 298, at 4–5.
300. Database of ICSID Member States, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps
/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Database-of-Member-States.aspx?tab=KtoO&rdo=BOTH
&ViewMembership=All [https://perma.cc/Q382-7VN8].
301. See Argentina in the Process of Quitting from World Bank Investment Disputes
Centre, MERCOPRESS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://en.mercopress.com/2013/01/31/argentina-inthe-process-of-quitting-from-world-bank-investment-disputes-centre [https://perma.cc/AMZ7D675].
302. See Database of ICSID Member States, supra note 300.
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regulated entities. The size and regulatory authority of local
governments in federal countries magnifies this effect.303
Additionally, many nation-states have granted significant
authority to regional governments in recent years. In October 2016,
the Belgian region of Wallonia temporarily blocked the Belgian
government’s (and therefore effectively the entire EU’s) ability to
sign the CETA with Canada, relying on features of the Belgian
federal structure that give regional parliaments a say in foreign
affairs.304 In the United States, a robust constitutional federalism—
one that holds that the states should operate free from national
interference across a wide range of issues—provides states with
significant independent regulatory authority.305 More recently, it has
given them the basis to act in areas, such as climate change or
securities regulation, in which the federal government has declined to
regulate aggressively.306 In other nations, a push for regional
autonomy drives devolution. Following Kosovo’s declaration of
independence in 2008, for instance, autonomy movements have
gained traction in Spain and elsewhere.307
The United Kingdom has also been a particularly active site for
exploring increased powers for localities. In the 1990s, Scotland and
Wales received a significant boost in their autonomy, including
individual parliamentary bodies with authority over a variety of

303. See supra Section I.B (discussing the relative size of state and provincial
economies).
304. Barrie McKenna, What’s Wallonia’s Deal? A Primer on its Role in CETA’s Crisis,
GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business
/international-business/european-business/explainer-ceta-wallonia-europe-and-canada
/article32489554/ [https://perma.cc/GFF7-XP7R] (noting that Wallonia was able to de
facto block Belgium’s ability to sign CETA, and that the rest of the EU had indicated it
would only go forward if its 28 members were unanimous).
305. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
306. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Scaling “Local”: The Implications of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation in San Bernardino County, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 689, 690 (2009) (“[California]
used its power over [San Bernadino], through the California Environmental Quality Act
and the San Bernadino County Superior Court, to push that local governmental unit to
take action . . . .”); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59,
63 (2010) (“State and local energy, environmental, and land use agencies must consider
how to account for climate change when planning infrastructure and regulating
facilities.”).
307. Alejandro López, Spain: Regional Catalan President Calls Early Elections,
WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/01
/26/cata-j26.html [http://perma.cc/49TQ-DJTE] (discussing pressure for a secessionist vote
in the Catalonia region of Spain).
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areas.308 Not satisfied, in September 2014, Scotland held a referendum
on full independence.309 While the referendum failed, an
unexpectedly close vote resulted in promises from the United
Kingdom for even further autonomy.310 Calls for devolution within
the United Kingdom have received renewed impetus following the
June 2016 “Brexit” referendum. Within the United Kingdom, fiftytwo percent voted in favor of Britain leaving the European Union.311
However, majorities in London, Scotland, and Northern Ireland
voted in favor of staying within the European Union.312 In the fallout
from Brexit, London—a global financial capital—has called for
greater independence from the United Kingdom in order to preserve
its global standing,313 while Scotland has revisited the possibility of
secession.314 Although the outcome of these calls for devolution
remains to be seen, they offer a window into how local governments
might be allowed more direct interaction with international

308. The British Parliament “devolved” a range of authority onto the Scottish, Welsh,
and Northern Irish governments it created. Devolution of Powers to Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, GOV.UK (Feb. 18, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-ofpowers-to-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/D9ES-JCL3] (discussing
“how the political and administrative powers of the devolved legislature—Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland—have changed as a result of devolution”). Scotland received the
greatest range of authority, including administration of its own justice system, public
works, and some powers over taxation. What Powers Does Scotland Have?, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 31 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20314150 [http://
perma.cc/9BN5-KBHC]. Devolution differs from federalism in that the statutes devolving
authority on local governments are ordinary statutes that can be changed by the central
government. As a result, the state is technically still a unitary state, though the political
costs of changing the allocation of authority between the center and localities may not
differ significantly between a unitary state with devolved authority such as the United
Kingdom, and a system of constitutional federalism, such as the United States.
309. Kenan Malik, Opinion, United Kingdom, Divided People, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/opinion/kenan-malik-united-kingdom-dividedpeople.html [http://perma.cc/K54E-KXLH] (discussing referendum for Scotland’s
independence).
310. Id. (“In the run-up to the vote, as opinion polls suggested that the Yes vote might
just prevail, panic-stricken politicians in London promised to devolve, or transfer, more
powers to the Scottish Parliament.”).
311. Brian Wheeler & Alex Hunt, Brexit: All You Need to Know About the UK
Leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics32810887 [https://perma.cc/NHN7-CBX5].
312. Id.
313. Richard Brown, Opinion, Brexit: It’s Time London Took Back Control,
NEWSWEEK (June 24, 2016, 2:58 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/london-brexitdevolution-mayor-london-474417 [https://perma.cc/6C3C-9AHV] (discussing the mayor of
London’s proposal that London remain within the EU when the UK leaves).
314. Brexit: Nicola Sturgeon Says Second Scottish Independence Vote ‘Highly Likely,’
BBC NEWS (June 24, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics36621030 [https://perma.cc/8S6A-885Z].
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institutions. Relationships between localities and international
institutions could vindicate different local preferences about the
globalization within a single country.
Local government action on climate change provides a concrete
example of the international sweep of local action. Cities around the
world have come together to negotiate climate change agreements
meant to fill in the gaps in the formal international regime.315 U.S.
states have created transboundary carbon trading schemes as a
vehicle to reduce carbon emissions.316 The U.S. Conference of Mayors
produced the Climate Protection Agreement, under which hundreds
of U.S. cities agreed to take measures to combat climate change,
including striving to meet or beat Kyoto Protocol targets within their
own communities.317 Local governments have also been incredibly
active in creating different kinds of clean energy support programs.
Local governments have, for example, created FITs that pay
premiums for electricity produced from renewable sources.318
Subnational governments have created renewable portfolio
requirements, a regulatory measure that mandates that utility
companies generate or purchase a certain amount of renewable
power.319 They have also provided financial incentives for distributing
renewable energy, encouraging homeowners, for example, to install
solar panels on their roofs.320
More recently, nations have begun to appropriate this local
activity in service of fulfilling their international climate change
commitments.321 On September 15, 2015, the top climate change

315. See, e.g., Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Multilevel
Governance of Global Climate Change, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 141, 141–43 (2006)
(analyzing the Cities for Climate Protection program, a network of municipal governments
working to address climate change).
316. See Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways and the
Administrative State: Lessons from U.S. and Australian Climate Change Governance, 25
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 234–35 (2013).
317. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION
AGREEMENT (2005), http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement
.pdf [http://perma.cc/5L2F-EPCW] (“We will strive to meet or exceed Kyoto Protocol
targets for reducing global warming pollution by taking actions in our own operations and
communities . . . .”).
318. See Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 23, ¶ 5.83.
319. See Meyer, supra note 40, app. at 2013–25 (describing state level renewable energy
support programs in the United States).
320. Id.
321. See, e.g., Betsill & Bulkeley, supra note 315, at 142 (explaining that the European
Union has focused on “cities as a means to address environmental issues” and called on
“all local authorities to establish a Local Agenda . . . through participation with their
communities”).
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negotiators from the United States and China met in Los Angeles.322
They did not meet to discuss their nations’ efforts to combat climate
change, nor directly to discuss national efforts or commitments with
respect to the climate change agreement they hoped to conclude in
Paris in December 2015. Instead, they convened with the leaders of
about a dozen American and Chinese cities, states, and provinces.323
The purpose of the meeting was twofold. First, the meeting facilitated
discussions among these regional and local leaders about subnational
climate change mitigation efforts.324 Second, the summit concluded
with a declaration signed by the officials in attendance stating their
joint goal of reducing their governments’ impact on climate change, as
well as identifying individual framework commitments for each
participating locality.325 Beyond simply enshrining the commitments
of local leaders, the declaration also established a policy framework
through which the American and Chinese national governments
could satisfy obligations undertaken in the forthcoming climate
change agreement. In other words, the summit partially delegated
compliance with national climate change obligations to local
governments.
The delegation of international obligations to local governments
raises the possibility that significant action designed to address
international problems could avoid international review. Recent
research looking only at renewable energy shows that discriminatory
renewable energy support programs exist in twenty-three out of fifty
U.S. states.326 Indeed, while recent studies have identified twenty local
content requirements in the renewable sector at the national level,327
my research identifies forty-four such programs at the state level
alone.328 More such programs exist at the truly local level.329 This
evidence from just a single sector suggests that local discrimination is
a significant problem that requires international attention.

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

U.S.-CHINA CLIMATE LEADERS’ DECLARATION, supra note 41, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Meyer, supra note 40, app. at 1013–25.
SHERRY STEPHENSON, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
ADDRESSING LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS IN A SUSTAINABLE ENERGY TRADE
AGREEMENT 3 (2013) (“Scanning the available data, it appears that perhaps 20 new LCRs
affect the renewable energy sector.”).
328. Meyer, supra note 40, app. at 2013–25 (describing state level renewable energy
support programs in the United States).
329. See id.
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Moreover, the prevalence of local discrimination highlights the
risk of undermining the efficacy of international law, and especially
international dispute settlement, going forward. If nations can
simultaneously put their local governments beyond review and then
ask them to carry out international obligations, the successes of the
post-Cold War world in legalizing international relations face
rollback. Governmental form can, after all, be manipulated. The
shifting of power upward within the EU, and downward in countries
like Spain and the UK, testifies to the fluid nature of power
arrangements within countries. If international law insists that only
the nation-states can be liable and then immunizes a broad swath of
what the nation does, we can expect power to flow increasingly
downward to escape review. The acceleration of this trend will, in
turn, exacerbate the welfare and distributional implications of
immunity and thereby add to the stress on the international economic
system.
V. DIRECT LIABILITY
Immunity threatens the international economic system, yet
nations face strong incentives to substitute immunity for vicarious
liability. Policymakers need a liability rule that is more stable than
vicarious liability but avoids the cost of immunity. This Part argues
that direct liability is such a rule. This Part first explains how direct
liability would work and then argues that direct liability is a politically
feasible alternative.
A. How Direct Liability Would Work
Direct liability should become the default rule under
international economic law. This proposal has two components. First,
the law of state responsibility should provide that local governments
are directly responsible under international law for breaches of
international economic obligations. Second, grants of jurisdiction to
international tribunals to resolve trade and investment disputes
should be understood to include jurisdiction over claims against
subnational governments unless otherwise specified. Together, these
two rules would ensure that local governments can be held directly
accountable for violations of international law. At the same time,
national governments should also remain responsible for violations by
their subnational governments.
The proposed rule is thus one of joint and several liability. Other
versions of direct liability are, of course, possible. For example, one
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might adopt a rule that mirrors the ICSID Convention, under which
local governments are only amenable to jurisdiction and
responsibility if they have been designated in advance by their
national government and have themselves consented to the claim.
Alternatively, one might imagine a rule that permits claims against
local governments to be brought only against local governments,
absolving national governments of liability.
Joint and several liability has several virtues, however, that
better balance the interests of claimants and respondent governments
at both the national and local level. First, the availability and
adequacy of relief against subnational governments is a major
concern. Requiring national governments to remain liable for
violations by their subnational governments, as is done under the
ICSID Convention,330 ensures that a successful claimant has access to
relief. Second, making local responsibility and jurisdiction the default
rules, rather than requiring additional consent from both the national
and local government, ensures that the local government has the
proper incentives to consider the legality of its actions. If local
governments could evade effective international responsibility by
refusing to consent to jurisdiction, the incentives for local
governments to be law-abiding would be severely undercut.
Procedurally, a claimant would choose whether to bring its claim
against the nation, the local government, or both. Presumably, a
claimant will select the respondent from which it expects to most
easily and effectively obtain relief. For example, in a trade dispute in
which the challenging country has little economic leverage over the
local government, the claimants may choose to bring a claim against
the national government. Alternatively, a claimant might choose to
bring a claim against only the local government, because, for instance,
a local government may be more willing to settle.
An award against one level of government would not
automatically be enforceable against the other government if the
other government had not been party to the dispute. The judgment
would, however, be persuasive in a subsequent claim against the other
government, if for some reason an award against the initial
respondent did not result in an adequate remedy. For example, if a
local government is unable to pay the damages from an investment
arbitration award, the challenger could bring a claim against the
national government to have its responsibility established. This
proceeding should be fairly brief, requiring only a showing that the
330. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
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local entity is in fact a government for which the national government
is responsible.
In the trade context, matters are a bit more complicated. Because
trade concessions are made at the national level, and the remedy for a
failure to comply is the withdrawal of concessions, all relief is
necessarily at the national level. For this reason, we might expect that
claimants will always bring claims against the national government
under trade law. While that may be, claimants may have reasons for
bringing claims first against the local government. Bringing a claim
against a national government, after all, can have diplomatic and
political costs. Those costs are reduced in the event of a challenge to a
local government. A claimant may therefore test the legality of a local
government’s action through, for example, a WTO dispute against
only the local government. If the local government continues its
unlawful conduct, then the claimant can establish the responsibility of
the national government through a separate proceeding, if it wishes to
take that step. At that point, the claimant can seek authorization to
suspend concessions. As mentioned above, the successful challenger
should first suspend concessions that target the local government.
Only if those are insufficient should the suspended concession target
the respondent nation generally.
National governments would also have a right of intervention in
claims against their subnational governments. Thus, if an investment
claim challenged the actions of California, the United States could
still intervene if the challenger did not choose to include the United
States. This feature ensures that the national government can, if it
wishes, continue to play a role in shaping international jurisprudence.
The decisions of international tribunals bear on the nation’s own
obligations, as well as the liability of its other local governments. The
right of intervention thus ensures that the national government can
protect its long-term interests in the interpretation of international
obligations, while leaving local governments to defend the run-of-themill suits where liability (or the lack thereof) is more straightforward.
Likewise, as a matter of domestic law, national governments
would be free to reallocate any loss as they see fit. Nations could
impose losses absorbed by the national government on the local
governments, or could agree to absorb losses felt by local
governments. National governments can already do this, although
they rarely seem to do so. Joint and several liability might give
national governments a further incentive to think seriously about the
relationship between the local and national governments in
international affairs.
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The right of intervention also provides national governments
with the ability to act as counsel for their local governments. Local
governments may lack the legal or financial capacity to defend against
international claims. Many national governments may also lack this
capacity, but national governments are likely in a better position to
defend international claims than are local governments. A rule of
joint and several liability with a right of intervention ensures that the
national government can remain as involved in claims against its local
governments as it chooses to be.
Significantly, the form of direct liability proposed here would not
expose local governments to a raft of claims. Local governments
would continue to be protected by the relatively small value of
challenging most local programs. Even under current law, many local
acts, especially in the trade context, are not of sufficient magnitude to
warrant initiating a dispute. Nothing about a move to direct liability
would change this fact. While more claims might be brought in
anticipation of a greater chance at obtaining relief, local governments
would remain protected by the cost-benefit calculation claimants
make. International disputes are expensive and, in the trade context,
involve political and diplomatic decisions. Claimants would continue
to use the ability to bring these claims sparingly, given their costs and
potential rewards. Moreover, in the investment context, in which the
fear of disputes as an intimidation tactic is most real, the ability of the
national government to intervene should serve as at least a minimal
deterrent to frivolous litigation.
B.

Direct Liability Increases Welfare and Is Politically Feasible

The proposal outlined above would satisfy two conditions any
proposed liability rule should meet: (1) it increases general welfare,
and (2) it is politically feasible. From a general welfare perspective,
direct liability would create welfare gains that exceed those under
either vicarious liability or immunity. Direct liability creates greater
pressure on local governments to conform to their international
obligations by removing existing discriminatory practices. As
discussed in Part IV, removing these discriminatory practices will
increase the general welfare by allowing domestic consumers to
purchase goods, services and capital at the most competitive rates,
while also allowing foreign suppliers with comparative advantage
greater access to markets overseas. Going forward, direct liability also
establishes a precedent that local governments must comply with their
international obligations. Although the international law of state
responsibility has long required this, by placing responsibility solely
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on the national government the law of state responsibility has failed
to establish incentives for local compliance. Direct liability thus
improves the incentives for compliance, while at the same time giving
claimants better access to relief. Direct liability also alleviates the
distributional issues created by immunity. Centralized states can once
again bring claims and force liberalization of large local governments.
In addition, direct liability must be politically feasible. After all,
vicarious liability is a more efficient than immunity,331 although states
have gravitated towards immunity because it offers them certain
advantages that come at the expense of the overall welfare created by
economic treaties. As explained below, direct liability is indeed
politically feasible. Equally important, it is more stable than strict
immunity as a default rule. It is therefore more likely to remain in
place.
The push for immunity comes from federal nations that face high
costs when avoiding liability for local acts. States take precaution to
avoid liability—they liberalize—up until the point at which the
marginal costs of liberalization equal the marginal benefits in terms of
liability avoided. States with high political costs to liberalization at the
local level will prefer liability to liberalization once an agreement is in
place. As argued in Part III, this calculus pushes federal states to
negotiate for immunity rules ex ante. The reduced liability does come
at the cost of reduced gains from trade liberalization. Those gains,
however, would not be perfectly captured by the negotiating
government. The government is therefore willing to forego some
gains from trade in order to reduce its liability.
Direct liability offers national governments a superior resolution
to this problem. Direct liability allows national governments to shift
responsibility for local action onto local governments in the first
instance. From the national governments’ point of view, direct
liability thus achieves the same liability reduction goal as immunity.
To be sure, direct liability of the kind this Article has proposed above
does not completely eliminate national responsibility for local acts, as
immunity does. Nations can remain on the hook if local governments
cannot provide the mandated relief. And claimants can proceed
directly against the national government and will continue to do so
when effective relief is not available from the local government.
Nevertheless, one would still expect a significant reduction in national
liability for local acts as measured against vicarious liability.
Claimants might well prefer to bring claims against smaller, less
331. See supra Section II.B.
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staffed local governments than against national governments. As
discussed above, obtaining relief (especially in trade disputes) might
in some instances be easier and more effective against a local
government. And while a national government may intervene, it does
not have to if it prefers to let a challenged local government stand on
its own two feet.
Moreover, direct liability does not come with the same set of
costs as either vicarious liability or immunity. Direct liability
continues to give states an incentive to liberalize and successful
claimants a viable remedy. Indeed, the incentive to liberalize will be
increased because local jurisdictions will internalize the costs of their
actions to a greater extent.332
Put in terms of the model in Part III, direct liability reduces (but
does not eliminate) Y, a national government’s expected liability for
local acts. At the same time, it maintains or even increases the size of
X, the state’s expected utility as a claimant. All claims remain viable
(ensuring relief), and the liberalizing effect of those claims will be
greater than under either immunity or vicarious liability. Moreover,
C—the concessions necessary to contract around the default rule—is
eliminated by making direct liability the default rule. Because direct
liability delivers greater utility to national governments, they have
little incentive to contract around it. For this reason, direct liability
will be more stable as a default rule than vicarious liability.
The major political objection to direct liability would probably
come from local governments themselves. Under current law, local
governments can free ride on their national governments. Direct
liability would remove this ability. Local governments would now be
responsible for the consequences of their actions. In the negotiation
of economic agreements, local governments might therefore be
expected to oppose direct liability and push instead for immunity.
Indeed, U.S. governors have objected to certain provisions of the
TPP, such as protections for pharmaceutical companies that
effectively increase drug prices.333
Although liberalizing trade is politically unpopular at the
moment, local governments have often supported trade deals in the
332. See supra Part II.
333. See Letter from Peter Shumlin, Governor of Vermont, to Barack Obama,
President of the United States (June 1, 2011), http://infojustice.org/download/tpp/tppgovernment/Letter%20from%20VT%20Gov.%20Shumlin%20to%20President%20Obama
%20-%20June%201,%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VUS-BNTT] (discussing Governor
Shumlin’s support for limitations on intellectual property protections in the TPP based on
their effects on state governments).
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past. U.S. state governors, for example, overwhelmingly supported
NAFTA.334 Local governments are therefore unlikely to be a longterm obstacle.335 Indeed, they stand to gain from a move to direct
liability. The regime would give local governments—especially large
state or provincial governments likely to be involved in international
disputes, such as California—a greater say in the obligations imposed
upon them. This influence comes in two forms. First, knowing that
they are going to be subject to international obligations more directly
than they currently are, local governments will assert themselves at
the negotiations stage in an effort to influence the substantive terms
in economic agreements. This influence can be used to obtain
concessions that are especially important to them. For example,
California and Minnesota, states that have significant subsidies for
renewable energy that are vulnerable under economic law’s
nondiscrimination rules,336 might push for specific rules to protect
environmental subsidies. Alternatively, they might push for
concessions on market access for particular goods produced in-state.
Second, because local governments would be able to participate
in dispute resolution directly, they would be able to influence the
interpretation of international obligations. To be sure, national
governments would continue to play the predominant role here.
Trade agreements typically create “commissions” consisting of the
member states that are authorized to issue binding interpretative
notes, a practice that NAFTA parties have followed to clarify the
obligations contained in the investment chapter of that agreement.337
National governments could also use their right of intervention to
control litigation on legal issues of strategic importance to them.
Local governments would, however, be able to bring their perspective
to international disputes—a perspective that is at present almost
totally absent. Indeed, international economic law would be greatly
improved through consideration of the unique challenges local
governments face in meeting their economic, environmental, and
social goals consistent with international obligations.
334. See Douglas Seay & Wesley Smith, Why the Governors Support the NAFTA (and
Washington Doesn’t), HERITAGE FOUND. (June 15, 1993), http://www.heritage.org/research
/reports/1993/06/bg946nbsp-why-the-governors-support-the-nafta [https://perma.cc/4V43-98F5].
335. This proposal could also be modified to respond to specific concerns. For
example, the direct liability regime might only apply to regional (i.e., state/provincial)
governments, and not truly local governments.
336. See Meyer, supra note 40, at 1962–65.
337. NAFTA, supra note 59, art. 1131 (“An interpretation by [the member states] of a
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this
Section.”).
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Finally, direct liability is consistent with the demand many
subnational governments make for greater power relative to their
own national governments. Within the United States, state
governments would have a difficult time simultaneously arguing for
plenary state police powers (as they are understood to have under the
U.S. Constitution) and yet objecting to bearing the responsibilities
that come with such a power.
In this sense, direct liability elevates the status of local
governments and recognizes the critical role they play in federal
systems. Other federal governments with strong subnational units
might also find an unexpectedly warm reception from their local
governments. The EU is, once again, the clearest example. While EU
member states may be content to rest the responsibility for defending
certain claims on the EU, they might embrace the notion of a
continuing role in investment and trade policy.
In sum, in federal states in which there is a robust push and pull
between the center and the periphery, the periphery might well
welcome greater responsibilities as a sign of both of its status and as a
bargaining chip with the center. In federal states with weak
peripheries, the national government may simply impose direct
liability as a way to control its localities and avoid liability. In either
case, direct liability as a default rule would both facilitate local
participation in international economic law, while at the same time
furthering the goals of liberalization and accountability that underlie
the international economic system.
CONCLUSION
The world is full of a bewildering array of governmental
arrangements. Federations like the United States or Germany,
confederations like Switzerland, supranational institutions like the
EU, and unitary states like the United Kingdom all allocate their
powers differently. For many years, international law’s approach to
these domestic distinctions was to ignore them. That rule,
consolidated in the nineteenth century, might well have made sense
when the nation-state had only recently emerged as the dominant
form of political organization and international trade had not yet
captured a significant portion of economic activity.
Today that is no longer the case. Local and regional governments
regularly play a role in international affairs. U.S. states negotiate
agreements with Canadian provinces and foreign governments; the
policies of Mexican states or Canadian provinces affect the value of
American investments. Political power also regularly flows both
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upward—from member states to the EU—and downward—from the
United Kingdom to Scotland and Wales. Moreover, international
trade and foreign investment account for more than half of many
nations’ GDPs.338
International dispute resolution and the law of state
responsibility need to evolve to take these changing circumstances
into account. Unfortunately, the only change has been one that
formally preserves the centrality of the nation-state while practically
damaging international economic law’s ability to drive economic
growth and development. The time has come to reorient
government’s relationship to international law. Trade and investment
agreements like the TPP offer the ideal place to start.

338. See, e.g., Merchandise Trade (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank
.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS [https://perma.cc/7HBS-HVE3].
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